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INTRODUCTION

In two previous articles, I have criticized dominant
interpretations of Bankruptcy Code' § 363(f) as being contrary to
the plain meaning of the statute.2 Those articles also detailed the
consequences of those misinterpretations-a shift from the planprocess
that Congress
statement-focused
and-disclosure
envisioned when it enacted Chapter 11 toward a process of
nonplan sales free and clear of claims and interests, as well as
the use of in rem property interests rather than contracts to
minimize bankruptcy risk in real estate transactions.3 The
articles also posited that the shift from plan-based reorganization
to reorganization by sale was, if anything, detrimental to
unsecured, nonadministrative priority creditors and slow-moving
governmental agencies.4 Those articles were based on, among
other things, the thesis that the courts ought to follow the
statute's plain and straightforward meaning and implement
Congress's plan-focused scheme for Chapter 11 as enacted.5 If
adding either a preplan sale focus or a bankruptcy-proofing
mechanism to Chapter 11 is to occur, Congress should be the
body that makes the addition.
This Article presents a concise series of statutory
amendments that would, if enacted, establish a balanced process
for implementing nonplan sales of substantially all the assets of

1. Unless otherwise noted, all references to the "Code" or the "Bankruptcy Code"
are to Title 11 of the United States Code, and all references to the "Rules," the
"Bankruptcy Rules," or a particular "Rule" within them are references to the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
2. George W. Kuney, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code Section 363(f) and
Undermining the Chapter 11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235, 236-37 (2002) [hereinafter
Kuney, Misinterpretations1J; George W. Kuney, FurtherMisinterpretationof Bankruptcy
Code Section 363(): ElevatingIn Rem Interests and Promotingthe Use of PropertyLaw to
Bankruptcy-Proof Real Estate Developments, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 289, 290-91 (2002)
[hereinafter Kuney, MisinterpretationsIII.
3. Kuney, MisinterpretationsI, supra note 2, at 236-37, 258-59, 261, 263-65, 27273, 286; Kuney, Misinterpretations11, supra note 2, at 289-91, 313, 320, 331; see also In re
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d 283, 288-90, 293 (3d Cir. 2003) (considering the same
policy arguments discussed in MisinterpretationsI and holding that the sale of TWA
assets was free and clear of presale employment discrimination and travel voucher claims
connected to or arising out of those assets); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen,
The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 751 (2002) ("Corporate reorganizations
have all but disappeared. Giant corporations make headlines when they file for Chapter
11, but they are no longer using it to rescue a firm from imminent failure. Many use
Chapter 11 merely to sell their assets and divide up the proceeds.").
4. See Kuney, Misinterpretations I, supra note 2, at 277-82; Kuney,
Misinterpretations1I, supra note 2, at 289.
5. Kuney, Misinterpretations I, supra note 2, at 237, 286; Kuney,
MisinterpretationsII, supra note 2, at 329.
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a business.' The market forces' that have driven the use of
nonplan sales are strong and valid indicators of a need for the
less expensive and less time-consuming method of reorganization
via sale of substantially all the assets of a business! This Article
provides a proposal for an explicit procedural nonplan sale
alternative to the traditional plan and disclosure statement
reorganization in Chapter 11.' The Bankruptcy Code should be
6. Other commentators have favored a sale or auction process for reorganization.
See Omer Tene, Revisiting the Creditor'sBargain:The Entitlement to the Going-Concern
Surplus in CorporateBankruptcy Reorganizations, 19 BANKR. DEV. J. 287, 288 & nn. 2-3,
289 (2003) (discussing the academic debate regarding sale alternatives for the existing
Chapter 11 system and citing, inter alia, Douglas G. Baird, RevisitingAuctions in Chapter
11, 36 J.L. & ECON. 633 (1993), Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1998),
and Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1983)).
7. Anecdotally, in 2002 the Author attended the National Conference of
Bankruptcy Judges' annual meeting in Chicago due to a fellowship generously awarded to
him by that organization. The meeting took place in October, shortly after the publication
of Kuney, MisinterpretationsI, supra note 2. Reactions to that article varied, but one
repeated over and over in various forms by attending practitioners was "that is pretty
academic-my clients need to be able to sell their businesses without a plan." Reactions
from judges were more reserved and tended to focus on the tension between the words of
the statute and the common law of nonplan sales that has developed over time.
8.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, with jurisdiction over the popular
bankruptcy jurisdiction of Delaware, confirmed its support of the nonplan sale free and
clear technique in the TWA bankruptcy case despite the problems in finding explicit, clear
statutory support for the process. In re Trans World Airlines, 322 F.3d at 290-91, 293
(citing, inter alia, Collier on Bankruptcy).
9. Two other exit strategies exist in Chapter 11 besides plan confirmation or sale
of substantially all the assets of a business: dismissal of the case or conversion to Chapter
7. See Lisa Hill Fenning & Craig A. Hart, Measuring Chapter11: The Real World of 500
Cases, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 119, 131 (1996). Neither is very controversial, and both
appear adequate in practice under the statute as currently drafted. See id. at 147, 149
(demonstrating that dismissal and conversion to another chapter frequently occur within
the current bankruptcy system). Further, both may represent processes that lead to or
culminate in a successful bankruptcy case, despite their unsuccessful-sounding names.
See id. at 152-53 & n.103 (noting that dismissal after resolution of a precipitating dispute
is often a pattern in successful cases and that the low plan confirmation rate in Chapter
11 should not be equated with a low success rate in Chapter 11); see also Leif M. Clark et
al., What Constitutes Success in Chapter 11? A Roundtable Discussion, 2 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 229, 229-32 (1994) (discussing various types of success in Chapter 11); Lynn
M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large,
Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 597, 598-600, 602, 611 (1993) (critically
examining types of success in reorganization and classifying sale transactions as
successful reorganizations only if the core businesses remain intact in a single entity).
Note that it is the business that exits Chapter 11 through a sale, not the debtor. The
debtor continues to exist in Chapter 11 holding the proceeds of the sale. These proceeds
can then be distributed to claim- and interest-holders through a confirmed plan of
reorganization or, perhaps more efficiently, by a trustee after conversion of the case to one
under Chapter 7. Although the Code already provides for an out-of-the-ordinary-course-ofbusiness sale in § 363(b), little in the way of procedure is specified in the statute or the
Bankruptcy Rules. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2000); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002, 4001, 6004. As
a result, as demonstrated in the Appendix to this Article, the local rules of the nation's
bankruptcy courts contain a variety of procedures for § 363(b) and § 363(0 sales.
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amended to include an explicit process for a sale or sales of
substantially all the assets of a business free and clear of all
claims and interests subject to specific protections regarding
adequate disclosure, an appropriate opportunity for parties in
interest to be heard in support and opposition, and adequate
protection for those holding a legally cognizable interest"0 in the
assets sold." This alternative process for a business to
successfully exit Chapter 11 would increase the efficiency of the
reorganization process.'2 It would also provide an additional
mechanism for judges to address problematic single-asset real
estate (SARE) cases in a fair and meaningful manner.'" Rather
10. The subject of what, exactly, are or should be the boundaries of an "interest" in
property or assets is beyond the scope of this Article. See Kuney, MisinterpretationsI,
supra note 2, at 240 & n.21 (citing FolgerAdam Sec., Inc. v. DeMatteis/MacGregor,JV,
209 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2000), for the proposition that "interest" in property under
§ 363(f) is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code).
11.

Cf. NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS

§ 2.1.5, at 348 (1997) ("Preserving the value of an enterprise is not always accomplished
by a reorganization in a traditional sense. In some cases, selling certain assets to third
parties may be the most sensible and economically beneficial way to proceed."). This
Article proposes changes to the Code to promote such a procedure. The focus has been to
keep it simple and to attempt to graft the nonplan sale process into the Code and Rules
with as little disruption as possible, wedding the process to existing law and procedure to
incorporate as much existing precedent as possible.
12. Refer to text accompanying note 21 infra (discussing the nonplan sale process as
an efficient alternative to the costly and lengthy plan confirmation process).
13. Although earlier small business and other amendments to Chapter 11 were
designed, in part, to address SARE cases, they have not solved the problem, in part
because their drafters failed to adequately constrain the discretion of the bankruptcy
courts. See George W. Kuney & Jeffrey R. Patterson, Single Asset Real Estate Under 11
U.S.C. § 362(d)(3): A Narrower Construction than You Might Expect (Or, Why Every Hotel
Should Have a Gift Shop and Troubled Golf Courses Should Keep Their Bars Open), 26
CAL. BANKR. J. 123, 131 (2002) ("[I1f Congress hopes to create special 'hard and fast'
protections for lenders and to prevent perceived abuses in the Chapter 11 process, it will
have to completely and explicitly remove vague adjectives such as 'substantial' and
'incidental' and judicial discretion from the working of the statute."). The amendments
discussed in this Article would instead play to the discretion of bankruptcy courts by
providing a process that they can invoke. This is likely to be a better received and used
way to address a SARE problem. Although abusive SARE cases are less of a problem
today than in years past, the time to prepare the bankruptcy system for the next real
estate downturn is now, before the downturn occurs. See generally Dean Baker, The RunUp in Homes Prices: Is It Real or Is It Another Bubble?, Center for Economic and Policy
Research, at http://www.cepr.net/Housing-Bubble.htm (Aug. 5, 2002).
The recent plunge in stock prices has finally forced most policy analysts
and economists to acknowledge that the stock market had a bubble at its 19982000 peaks. Similarly, the recent fall in the dollar has increased the recognition
that the dollar was also over-valued.... [T]he economy has now developed a
third bubble, the collapse of which also poses a serious danger to the economy.
The third bubble is the housing market.
Id.; see also generally Richard Freeman, "Fannieand Freddie Were Lenders": U.S. Real
Estate Bubble Nears Its End, EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE R., June 21, 2002, http://
www.larouchepub.com/other/2002/2924fannie mae.html.
The U.S. financial system is now dependent to an unprecedented degree

2004]

LETS MAKE IT OFFICIAL

1269

than allowing the extra-statutory, ad hoc processes for nonplan
sales that have developed across the country 4 to continue,
Congress should address the matter in a statute that balances
the interests of all parties and the need for a fluid, efficient
process through which businesses can reorganize through sales of
substantially all their assets. Drawing on the experience of the
various courts and their experiments with a variety of
procedures, Congress can establish a uniform nonplan sale
process to serve the needs of reorganizing businesses.
The way in which Chapter 11 practice has developed over the
last twenty or so years indicates a clear demand for a process of
reorganization by nonplan sale.' 5 Debtors and their counsel have
sought it, the courts have allowed it when possible (arguably in
derogation of the plan-focused original intent of Chapter 11),' 6 and
Congress and the Rules Committee should now step in and
expressly provide for proper procedural protections to enhance the
fairness and efficiency of the nonplan sale process. This would
provide national uniformity to a process that is now governed by a
variety of local rules as well as, in some instances, requirements
laid down by individual bankruptcy judges."
upon one prop: the greatest housing-real estate bubble in human history. A
hyperinflationary spiral has sent home prices shooting up by 10-40% annually
inrecent years-depending on the region of the country-and artificially pushed
the price of millions of homes into the $400,000 to $1 million range or above.
Id.; see alsogenerally Tim Schooley, RetailersReact to Recession with Bankruptcy Filings,Store
Closings, P1TrrBURGH BUS. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, http://pittsburgh.bi~journals.com
/pittsburglstories/2002/0225/story3.html (noting that "2001 saw the most Chapter 11 filings
by publicly traded retail companies ever" and "a [potentially unprecedented] growing increase
in vacant space for big-box retailers" that could "'force rental rates down significantly' (quoting
an industry insider)). But see Kenneth N. Kee, One Size Fits Some: Single Asset Real Estate
Bankruptcy Cases, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1285, 1287-89, 1316-22 (2002) (arguing that removal
of the $4,000,000 cap on the definition of SARE cases will negatively impact the bankruptcy
system, and differentiating between large and small SARE cases statistically in a meaningful
manner). Although at least one commentator has posited that the 1994 amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code have returned bankruptcy judges to the level of administrative control they
enjoyed under the prior Bankruptcy Act, Harvey R. Miller, The Changing Face of Chapter 11:
A Reenergence of the Bankruptcy Judge as Producer, Director, and Sometimes Star of the
ReorganizationPassionPlay, 69 AM. BANK L.J. 431, 438-40 (1995), their control is far from
complete. Providing them with the power to order a sale of estate property in SARE cases
would increase their ability to motivate the parties to reach consensus or, alternatively, dispose
of the case efficiently.
14. The Appendix to this Article gathers, categorizes, and summarizes the local
rules of bankruptcy courts across the country and its territories. It demonstrates the wide
variety of procedural approaches that these courts have developed in the absence of
congressional rules or committee action in this area. Of course, these rules are just the
beginning. Each large volume practitioner or firm has its own preferred practice and
forms and can bring a motion in each individual case to tailor the process further.
15. Refer to note 7 supra.
16. See Kuney, MisinterpretationsI, supranote 2, at 235-37, 242-44, 272-73.
17. Refer to Appendix (collecting and categorizing local rules of bankruptcy courts
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Part II of this Article reviews the practical benefits of
reorganization by sale over reorganization by plan, noting
developments early in the Enron bankruptcy cases as
illustrative. Part III contains a series of proposed amendments
to the Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure to provide for a uniform nonplan sale process
nationwide, and Part IV concludes the argument. The
Appendix consists of a collection and categorization of
bankruptcy courts' local rules that have sought, in part, to
address the procedural gap left by a dearth of provisions in the
Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure that deal with the nonplan sale process.18
II.THE SALE ALTERNATIVE PLAYS TO THE BANKRUPTCY
SYSTEM'S STRENGTHS

Although not explicitly provided for by statute,'9 the
insolvency community" has embraced the nonplan sale of
substantially all the assets of a debtor's business as an
efficient alternative to the costly and lengthy plan
confirmation process.' By selling the assets of a business as a
unit, rather than in a piecemeal liquidation, going concern
value can be captured for the benefit of the estate." Further,
by reducing the assets of the estate to cash, 3 a note secured by
nationwide on the subject).
18. Refer to note 9 supra (discussing the procedural gap).
19. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2000) (referring generically to sales out of the ordinary
course of business, which include sales of substantially all the assets of the business).
20. The "insolvency community" denotes all those involved in the liquidation and
reorganization of assets and businesses, including debtors, creditors, turnaround
specialists, investment bankers, accountants, attorneys, trustees, bankruptcy judges,
bankruptcy court clerks, and United States Trustees and their attorney-advisors and
analysts.
21. Kuney, MisinterpretationsI, supra note 2, at 273, 275-77, 280, 285. Refer also to
note 7 supra.
22. See William T. Bodoh et al., The Parameters of the Non-Plan Liquidating
ChapterEleven: Refining the Lionel Standard,9 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 10-12 (1992); see also
In re Naron & Wagner, Chartered, 88 B.R. 85, 90 (Bankr. D. Md. 1988) (discussing sale to
realize going concern value and comparing sale proceeds to liquidation value); John D.
Ayer, Bankruptcy as an Essentially Contested Concept: The Case of the One-Asset Case, 44
S.C. L. REV. 863, 869 (1993) ("A third purpose, perhaps somewhat more difficult to grasp,
but nonetheless essential to modern bankruptcy law, is the preservation of going-concern
values.... IT]he idea of preserving going-concern values seems particularly linked to the
developing notion of bankruptcy as a device for reorganizing, as distinct from merely
liquidating, a debtor.").
23. Cf, e.g., In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc., 287 B.R. 112, 119 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002)
("Using that power conferred under section 365 to assign leases even without lessor
consent, debtor lessees can sell the lessee's interests in such leases to those willing to pay
for them-converting, for their creditors, into the much more liquid asset of cash, the
economic value in the leases.").
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the assets sold, 4 the stock of the purchaser, or some other
similar form of fungible valuable consideration,25 the tasks and
costs of postsale management and administration of a debtor
and its estate can be dramatically reduced." In turn, this
allows for a reduction in the amount of a debtor's value that is
redistributed from prepetition creditors to postpetition
administrative claimants as a case drags on.27 It takes little in
the way of a management team to preside over an estate
comprised solely of liquid assets. Further, once reduced to
liquid assets, proposal and confirmation of a strict or absolute
priority plan28 or conversion of the case to one under Chapter
24. See, e.g., In re Taylor, 198 B.R. 142, 144 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996) (describing a
debtor who sought to sell five nursing home facilities for a combination of cash,
assumption of debt, and two promissory notes).
25. Id. ("Delta South Carolina, Inc., a corporation recently formed, would be the
purchaser of the properties, and its stock would be pledged to secure the two notes to
Taylor [the debtor]."),
26. See, e.g., In re Auto Parts Club, Inc., 224 B.R. 445, 449 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1998)
(disallowing a request for fees that were deemed excessive in light of the decision to sell
substantially all the assets of business via a nonplan sale).
27. The evil of a Chapter 11 case that drags on longer than it should is borne
primarily by unsecured creditors and, to the extent that they are "in the money," equity
holders as their priority is "primed" by the growing mass of administrative claims of
management insiders and bankruptcy professionals such as accountants, attorneys,
examiners, and trustees. See In re Taxman Clothing Co., 49 F.3d 310, 316 (7th Cir. 1995).
The result [disgorgement of professional fees] is harsh. But being a creditor
and seeing your claim get eaten by a lawyer is a harsh fate as well. Even after
the passage of 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1), bankruptcy is not intended to be a feast for
lawyers. As we read in In re Toney, "absent extraordinary circumstances,
bankruptcy estates should not be consumed by the fees and expenses of courtappointed professionals."
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting In re Toney, 171 B.R. 414, 415 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994));
Samuel L. Bufford, Chapter 11 Case Management and Delay Reduction: An Empirical
Study, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 90 (1996) ("Creditors in general are the principal
beneficiaries of shorter chapter 11 cases. Creditors suffer the expenses and losses
resulting from delay in a chapter 11 case. Their point of view is generally that they are
better off if a case reaches disposition sooner, rather than later."). Barring a declining
market for their collateral, secured creditors are largely immune from these detrimental
effects at least to the extent of their secured claim. But see id. at 90-92 (noting that
"[slecured creditors are the clearest beneficiaries of the early disposition of a chapter 11
case"). Of course, as interest continues to accrue on the secured claims up to the value of
the creditors' collateral, any previously "free" value in that collateral is converted into
part of the secured claims, making it unavailable to unsecured creditors. 11 U.S.C.
§ 506(a), (b) (2000); see also David Gray Carlson, Adequate ProtectionPayments and the
Surrender of Cash Collateral in Chapter 11 Reorganization, 15 CARDOzo L. REv. 1357,
1368-69 (1994).
28. These plans are sometimes referred to as "pot plans" in practice, evoking the
image of a soup kitchen in which claimants and interest holders line up in groups
according to priority to have their bowls filled pro rata. When the soup runs out,
distributions cease. Plans of this sort would not face the bugaboo of expensive litigation
regarding the existence and application of the new value exception to the absolute priority
rule or the reorganization value of an enterprise. See, e.g., In re PWS Holding Corp., 228
F.3d 224, 228, 231, 237-42 (3d Cir, 2000) (addressing a confirmation order detailing
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should lead to speedy distributions to creditors and a

minimum of haggling and litigation over proper priorities.
Essentially, the nonplan sale route capitalizes on one of the
most powerful reorganization qualities of the Chapter 11 scheme:
separating assets from liabilities. In the classic, voluntary,
Chapter 11 reorganization-by-plan scenario, this process begins
with the filing of the bankruptcy petition, ° the creation of the
bankruptcy estate,3 the transfer of all of the debtor's nonexempt
property to the estate,32 and the imposition of the automatic
stay."' At that point, the first stage of separating the assets from
prepetition liabilities has begun; the assets have been isolated
and provided with sanctuary from the activities of prepetition
creditors.34 The second stage of this separation under the
expensive litigation involving, inter alia, the absolute priority rule, the new value
exception, and reorganization value); In re Bonner Mall P'ship, 2 F.3d 899, 901 (9th Cir.
1993) (discussing and upholding the new value exception to the absolute priority rule).
Because a nonplan sale would permit old equity to participate in the bidding process for
the sale of the business, there will be no question that, when control of a business is
reacquired by old equity, it has been purchased with money or money's worth after
exposure to the market. See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. 203 N. La Salle St.
P'ship, 526 U.S. 434, 442-44, 458 (1999) (discussing the new value exception to the
absolute priority rule and determining that, if the exception exists, it is not met when old
equity has the exclusive right to contribute the new value without exposing that
opportunity to the market). Exposure to the market, rather than a judge's estimate, would
also determine reorganization value. Refer to note 66 infra (discussing the difficulty of
asset valuation without a market).
29.
Conversion to the Chapter 7 route for postsale distributions would have the
support of panel trustees nationwide. See, e.g., Michael J. Herbert & Domenic E. Pacitti,
Down and Out in Richmond, Virginia:The DistributionofAssets in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy
Proceedings Closed During 1984-1987, 22 U. RICH. L. REv. 303, 311 (1988) (finding that
nothing was distributed to creditors in 95.6% of Chapter 7 cases). Of course, it is probable
that courts will recognize the ease with which these trustees may administer cases in
which assets have already been marshaled and reduced to money or money's worth by.
their former owners and operators, who presumably were farther up the learning curve
than any panel trustee could ever be and were thus able to generate value that would
have been unobtainable in traditional Chapter 7 practice. This should lead to awards of
far less than the maximum allowable trustees' fees to reflect the level of actual services
provided. See 11 U.S.C. § 326(a) (detailing maximum trustee compensation on a sliding
scale, but not requiring that the maximum be awarded); see also 28 C.F.R. § 58 app. A
(2003) (setting out "Guidelines for Reviewing Applications for Compensation and
Reimbursement of Expenses Filed Under 11 U.S.C. § 330"). The availability of funds in
those postsale Chapter 7 cases would also make it possible for the trustees to explore and
pursue appropriate avoidable transfers, a job that former management may be ill
prepared or unmotivated to do. Success in this regard could increase distributions to
unsecured creditors.
30.
11 U.S.C. § 301.
31.
Id. § 541.
32. Id. § 542.
33. Id. § 362.
34.
See id. (detailing the automatic stay); id. § 541 (defining what comprises
property of the estate); 5 ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 91541.01 (15th ed. rev. 2003) ("Property belonging to the estate is protected
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traditional reorganization-by-plan scenario is completed upon
confirmation and consummation of a plan of reorganization 5 that

specifies how the assets are to be deployed" and how the product
and proceeds of those assets will be applied to pay prepetition
and postpetition claims, if at all.37 A nonplan sale completes the
separation of the assets from the liabilities much sooner and in a
more complete fashion, replacing the assets with their proceeds
and allowing a business-but not the debtor, its former ownerto emerge from the bankruptcy estate and escape the negative
effects of the administrative expense, uncertainty, and social
stigma that is attendant upon doing business as a debtor. 8 That
accomplished, the creditors and interest holders can then sort out
their relative claims to the proceeds and the means by which
value will be divided and distributed among them. By
compartmentalizing these reorganization functions into two
distributional
and
redeployment
stages-asset
categorization/treatment-the reorganization process is made
more efficient: operating assets are returned to the
nonbankruptcy world with lower transaction costs than under
the reorganization-by-plan scenario.39
from the piecemeal reach of creditors .... It is this central aggregation of property that
").
promotes the effectuation of the fundamental purposes of the Bankruptcy Code ..
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (listing confirmation requirements); id. § 1141 (discussing
35.
the effect of plan confirmation); see also id. § 1127 (discussing the modification of a plan
and the concept of substantial consummation).
36.
See id. § 1123(a) (requiring, among other things, that a plan shall designate
classes of claims, specify treatment of impaired and unimpaired claims, and provide
adequate means for the plan's implementation and payment of claims).
37.
See, e.g., In re Channel One Communications, Inc., 125 B.R. 236, 236-37
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991) (discussing postsale confirmation of a plan to distribute proceeds
of sale of substantially all the debtor's assets).
38.
See Bufford, supra note 27, at 89-90. Judge Bufford writes:
The reduction of delay in chapter 11 cases should be a noncontroversial
goal. After all, the uncertainty of conducting business while in chapter 11 is a
cloud that looms over both creditors and debtors. For example, suppliers are less
willing to do business with a debtor in chapter 11, and may require cash on
delivery or advance deposits. Customers may be less willing to buy the debtor's
products, for fear that they may not receive service when needed at a later date.
In addition, creditors may eventually want the debtor to pay their professional
fees for dealing with the bankruptcy. As competitors sense that a kill is
available, they too will get involved by increasing pressure on the market place.
To limit these and other problems, a reduction of chapter 11 delays seems to be a
beneficial objective for all involved. This is not, however, always the case.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
39.
See, e.g., In re Brookfield Clothes, Inc., 31 B.R. 978, 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
Simply put, the wasting asset in this instance may be characterized as the
"going concern" value of the fully stopped business.
In sum, we conclude that an "emergency sale" of substantially all of the
assets of a debtor-in-possession is permitted under § 363(b) and that Brookfield
met its burden of showing sufficiently exigent circumstances to warrant the
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The Enron bankruptcy cases provide a clear example of the
potential benefits of the sale process. Enron filed its petitions for
relief beginning on December 2, 2001.40 The events immediately
preceding the commencement of these cases created much
confusion and outrage and gave rise to extensive criticism of
Enron's accountants, management, retirement account policies,
and related matters. 41 But, from a bankruptcy perspective, all
immediate sale to Zion.
Id.; see also Robert G. Hansen & Randall S. Thomas, Auctions in Bankruptcy: Theoretical
Analysis and PracticalGuidance, 18 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 159, 164 (1998).

Auctions have a well-deserved reputation as efficient mechanisms for
simultaneously transferring ownership of an asset and determining the price at
which the transfer will occur. In a bankruptcy proceeding, auctions of the
insolvent company could be an efficient method for accomplishing the valuation
of assets and the reallocation of control of assets that are at the heart of the
current bankruptcy procedures.
Id.; Erica M. Ryland, Note, Bracingfor the "FailureBoom": Should a Revlon Auction Duty
Arise in Chapter11?, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2255, 2277 (1990).
A requirement that managers "auction" the entity as part of the process of
formulating a plan of reorganization could insure that opportunism in the
valuation process will be minimized. An established fair market price for the
reorganized entity can then be used by the bankruptcy court for evaluation of
various alternatives, insuring that the claimants receive at least this price. This
would simultaneously block creditors from their tendency to undervalue the firm
and block shareholders from their tendency to overvalue it.
Id. (footnote omitted).
40. See Voluntary Petition, In re Enron Corp. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001) (No. 01-16034
(AJG)); Press Release, Enron Corp., Enron Files Voluntary Petition for Chapter 11
Reorganization; Sues Dynegy for Breach of Contract, Seeking Damages of at Least $10
Billion (Dec. 2, 2001), http://www.enron.com/corptpressroom/releases/2001/ene/Press
Releasell-12-02-01letterhead.html [hereinafter Enron Files for Chapter 11]. Enron did
not eventually effect the OpCo business plan as initially conceived and discussed in this
Article. The OpCo reorganization strategy remains pertinent, however, illustrating the
use of § 363 to separate assets from liabilities and remove operating enterprises from the
bankruptcy estate while retaining their benefits and proceeds.
41. See, e.g., Second Interim Report of Neil Batson Court-Appointed Examiner at
11, In re Enron Corp. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 01-16034 (AJG)) [hereinafter Batson
Report] ("In the months immediately following Enron's disclosures, allegations surfaced of
securities fraud, accounting irregularities, energy market price manipulation, money
laundering, breach of fiduciary duties, misleading financial information, ERISA
violations, insider trading, excessive compensation and wrongdoing by certain of Enron's
bankers."); see also PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, THE ROLE OF THE BOARD
OF DIRECTORS IN ENRON'S COLLAPSE, S. REP. No. 107-70, at 11 (2002). [hereinafter
REPORT ON BOARD OF DIRECTORS].

Steady revelations since October 2001 have raised questions about numerous
aspects of the company's operations, from its extensive undisclosed off-the-books
dealings, often with companies run by Enron personnel, to an April 2002 SEC
filing announcing that the company's financial statements were unreliable and
the book value of its assets would have to be written-down as much as $24
billion, to its apparent intention to manipulate the California energy market, to
tax strategies which apparently included Enron's ordering its tax department to
produce billions of dollars in company earnings through the use of complex tax
shelters.
Id. Enron's crisis of reputation has lived on past the company's bankruptcy filing to be
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that was the past; apart from recoveries of prepetition avoidable
transfers such as preferences and fraudulent conveyances, the
events of the past would not affect the amount of value that the
Enron companies could generate in order to fund distributions to
creditors and interest holders.42
Enron's insolvency professionals realized this. As a result, as
early in the case as possible, in light of the public, media, and
congressional uproar, they began a two-stage process that sought
to maximize the value of the companies' assets through sales of
business units as going concerns.48 Stage one was to explore sales
to third parties." Stage two was to organize an internal sale
identified by management as one of the risk factors involved in the success of the onceproposed subsidiary "OpCo." See OpCo Energy Company, Business Plan 37 (May 2002)
(unpublished document, on file with the Houston Law Review) [hereinafter OpCo
Business Plan].
The success of OpCo as a going concern will depend on its ability to
separate reputationally from Enron.
The OpCo businesses are currently impaired in their ability to deal with
partners, suppliers, customers and regulators due to the liquidity issues and
reputational cloud resulting from the Enron collapse.... In addition, there can
be no assurance that counterparties and regulators will be adequately comforted
to accept OpCo-which will initially be under common control with Enron-as a
new and truly independent entity. Similarly, OpCo's ability eventually to become
a publicly-traded entity and/or raise outside equity will be impaired if the
market and applicable regulatory authorities do not accept OpCo as a separate
entity.
Id.; see generally ENRON: CORPORATE FIAscos AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS (Nancy B.
Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., forthcoming 2004) (manuscript on file with the Houston
Law Review) (using Enron as a teaching example for law and business students).
42. This stands in sharp contrast to, for example, the corporate or accounting
perspective. Those involved in nonbankruptcy. fields may have much to learn from the
Enron story, both prepetition and postpetition. But from a bankruptcy perspective, as is
always the case, unless the prepetition activities generate a cause of action under the
Bankruptcy Code or applicable nonbankruptcy law against defendants who are able to
respond to a judgment, the past is dead and largely irrelevant to the prospects for
liquidation or reorganization and distributions to creditors.
43. See Press Release, Enron Corp., Enron Commences Auction Process to
Maximize Value of Core Assets (Aug. 27, 2002), http://www.enron.com/corp/pressroom/
releases/2002/ene/29-082702ReleaseLtr.html [hereinafter Enron Core Assets Press
Release] (announcing sale of "certain major assets").
44. Enron alluded to these sales when it announced it was filing for Chapter 11
Bankruptcy. See Enron Files for Chapter 11, supra note 40 ("In addition, the company
will continue its accelerated program to divest or wind down non-core assets and
operations. Details of the units to be affected will be communicated shortly."). Since filing
for bankruptcy, Enron has sold over $5 billion in assets. See Rebecca Smith, Enron May
Split Off Pipeline Units, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2003, at AS. In the context of these asset
sales, Enron's management has argued that as opposed to reorganization or liquidation,
the § 363 bidding process would both minimize risk and maximize value, by allowing
greater flexibility for acceptance of higher and better offers, keeping all sale options open,
and avoiding a "fire sale" perception by the market. See OpCo Business Plan, supra
note 41, at 6.
lAin OpCo § 363 sale on the other hand, accomplishes two objectives for the
Estate-it mitigates risk and maximizes value.
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process that would separate the companies' productive assets not
sold from their liabilities and from the costs and delays of
bankruptcy administration. 5
Stage one sales have included, most notably, the sale of
Enron's once-vaunted energy trading business.46 Stage two was

While the company believes there will be considerable interest in OpCo or
its individual assets by unaffiliated third parties through the market-driven
§ 363 bidding process, it is possible that the bids received may not necessarily
maximize value to, or be in the best interest of the Estate. Conforming bids
might be received that are substantially below the Estate's view of market value
or numerous, non-conforming market-based bids may be received for only
portions of the OpCo asset base that, upon consideration of the discrete
valuations of remaining assets, are detrimental to the going concern value of
OpCo as an integrated, regionally focused energy company.
Id. On August 27, 2002, Enron announced its intention to auction the core assets referred
to in the OpCo Business Plan. See Enron Core Assets Press Release, supra note 43.
Consistent with a plan outlined in May to maximize the value of its core
assets, Enron Corp. announced today that it has commenced a formal sales
process for its interests in certain major assets. The company is extending
invitations to visit electronic data rooms containing information on 12 of Enron's
most valuable businesses to a broad universe of potential bidders with whom the
company has executed confidentiality agreements.
Id; see also Jim Kennett, Enron Opens Bids on 12 Businesses to Pay Creditors,
detnews.com, at http://www.detnews.com/2002/business/0208/28/b03-572726.htm (Aug.
28, 2002).
Enron Corp., the former energy trader that owes creditors more than $50
billion, put a dozen remaining businesses up for sale as the company seeks to
raise money and get out of bankruptcy.
Enron may yet keep the businesses together, said Martin Bienenstock, the
company's bankruptcy lawyer.
"We're going to find out whether the pieces together are worth more than
they are separately," Bienenstock said. "We need bids to determine that."
Id.; see also Eric Berger, Enron Tests Waters For Big Assets: Bids May Fetch More than
Group Sale, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 28, 2002, at 1B ("Enron asked Tuesday [August 27,
20021 for bids on 12 of its most valuable remaining assets .... The court is using this
process to see if the creditors can raise more money by selling these operations piecemeal
than by putting them together to build a new company.").
45. See OpCo Business Plan, supra note 41, at 2.
Taking into consideration Enron's core competencies, the market's postpetition dynamics, and the nature of the individual assets comprising the Enron
Estate, Enron believes there is significantly more value in a combined company
comprised of certain key assets that regionally form an integrated asset portfolio
versus separate discrete asset sales. As such, Enron proposes the formation of
OpCo Energy Company ... to effectuate the separation of an integrated asset
portfolio from the bankruptcy Estate. Management believes that such an
approach will maximize the value of the business and will allow it to prosper as
a going concern. The remaining Estate assets will continue to be liquidated in an
orderly process.
Id.
46. See Enron Hopes to Rise From the Ashes, WORLD GAS INTELLIGENCE, May 8,
2002,
at
P4,
http://www.energyintel.com/DocumentDetail.asp?ppvorderid=26709
&documentid=66634 ('The trading operation has already been sold to Swiss investment
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formally announced in early spring 2002"7 and involved the
proposed formation of a subsidiary, "OpCo," that would be
available to buy assets in exchange for its own stock. 4 In other
words, OpCo, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Enron companies,
at least initially, would be available to buy assets free and clear
in exchange for its equity interests. 49 There would be no question
bank UBS Warburg....").
47. See Press Release, Enron Corp., Enron Presents Process to Creditors'
Committee for Separating Power, Pipeline Company, from Bankruptcy, (May 3, 2002),
http':/www.enron.com/corp/pressroom/releases/2002/ene/23-050302releaseltr.html.
Enron Corp. (ENRNQ) presented today [May 3, 2002] a process to its
Unsecured Creditors' Committee to maximize recoveries through the exploration
of a variety of alternatives for moving the company's core energy assets out from
under its Chapter 11 case.
Under the proposal, which will be facilitated through Section 363 of the
Bankruptcy Code, the new company would be an energy infrastructure business
focused on the transportation, distribution, generation and production of natural
gas and electricity primarily in North, Central and South America.
Id.; see also Week in Review, Enron Asset Sale Could Doom Company's Restructuring,
Hous. Bus. J. (Sept. 2002), http://houston.bizjournals.com/houston/stories/200209/02/
weekinbiz.html.
In May, Enron unveiled a strategy for emerging from bankruptcy that
included shedding its name and donning the OpCo moniker to focus on being a
mover of electricity and natural gas. The new company would have more than
15,000 miles of pipeline, $10.8 billion in total assets and projected earnings in
excess of $1.3 billion in 2003 before interest, income taxes, depreciation and
amortization.
Id.
48. For a more detailed enumeration of OpCo's proposed financing, see OpCo
Business Plan, supra note 41, at 25. "OpCo assumes that it (or a subsidiary) acquires
certain receivables (principal plus accrued interest) held by Enron or its affiliates and
payable by unconsolidated subsidiaries of OpCo by issuing equity." Id. "OpCo consolidates
investments in investees in which OpCo maintains more than 50% of the voting control of
the investees and reflects minority ownership interests accordingly." Id. "OpCo uses the
equity method to account for investments in investees in which OpCo does not maintain
more than 50% of the voting control (directly or indirectly) of the investees." Id.
"Intercompany account balances as of December 31, 2001 between consolidated OpCo
subsidiaries and Enron and its affiliates have been netted and reclassified as equity of
OpCo." Id.
49. Indeed OpCo's ability to purchase assets was seen by management as one way
of ensuring that Enron got a fair or good price for the assets it auctioned. Id. at 3.
OpCo itself will be the stalking horse in an auction process that ensures the
market the opportunity to create the highest value for the creditors of the
Estate. The market can bid for all or specified segments of OpCo in a
transparent auction process. Any qualifying topping offers will be considered.
Formation of OpCo will provide support to the auction process, given an
energy asset marketplace already overloaded with properties for sale.
Id. Management also believed that the assets were worth more combined as OpCo than
they would be were they individually liquidated. See id. ("The expected value of OpCo as a
going concern significantly exceeds the expected value resulting from a liquidation of the
separate assets."); see also Berger, supra note 44.
Since becoming CEO, Cooper has said he believes the assets have more
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of fair value, because Enron was only moving the assets from an
operating company-one in bankruptcy-to another and, in the
process, converting the old operating company into a holding
company."0 In this way, if attractive outside sales of assets did
not materialize, OpCo could provide a means for segments of
Enron's businesses to continue without the supervision,
administration, and direct oversight of the bankruptcy court and

value as a whole.
To that end, he has proposed that a new business, tentatively called OpCo
Energy Co., make a bid on all the assets as a unit. He says that would offer
creditors a stream of future revenues worth more than the cash in hand.
Id.
50.
See NORTHWEST NATURAL GAS Co., FORM 10-Q, at 14 (2002), available at
http://biz.yahoo.com/e/020514/nwngmlO-q.html.
On May 3, 2002, Enron publicly announced that it had presented a process
to its Unsecured Creditors' Committee which contemplated the establishment of
a new energy infrastructure company focused on the transportation,
distribution, generation and production of natural gas and electricity. Enron
disclosed that the new company, currently called OpCo Energy Company, would
be a holding company ....
Id. On March 19, 2003, Enron announced that there was no successful bidder for its
pipelines, and that consequently it was forming a new entity, PipeCo. Although smaller in
scale than the original OpCo, which was to include among other things utilities such as
Portland General Electric (PGE), PipeCo follows the same basic plan as OpCo. See Press
Release, Enron Board Approves Proposal to Create New Pipeline Company (Mar. 19,
2002), http://www.enron.com/corp/pressroom/releases/2003/ene/031903releasepdf.html.
The new company, temporarily referred to as "PipeCo," would include
Enron's interests in Transwestern Pipeline Company, Citrus Corp., and
Northern Plains Natural Gas Company.
PipeCo is expected to be a new corporate entity governed by an independent
board of directors. Upon resolution of Enron's Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, it is
anticipated that shares of PipeCo would be distributed to creditors in connection
with Enron's plan of reorganization. The formation of PipeCo will require
various Board, bankruptcy court and other regulatory approvals, as well as the
consent of the Official Unsecured Creditors' Committee.
Id.; see also ENRON CORP., FORM 8-K, at 2 (2003), available at http://www.enron.com/
corp/investors/sec/2003/2003-03-19-S-Kpdf.
The Company no longer proposes to combine its North American and
international energy infrastructure business under one umbrella, as
contemplated by the OpCo Energy Company proposal. However, as a result of
the auction process and analysis described above, the Company's Board of
Directors has determined that it is in the best interests of the Company's
stakeholders, including its creditors, to hold the North American Pipeline
Interests in a new pipeline operating entity (temporarily referred to as "PipeCo")
and to terminate the sales efforts with respect to such interests. PipeCo is
expected to be a new corporate entity, governed by an independent Board of
Directors and afforded protection from joint and several Enron group liabilities
associated with the Enron bankruptcy case.
Id.; see also Michael Rose, PGE Might Go Public-Private:The Willamette Valley Power
ProposalGains Ratepayer Support, STATESMAN J., June 12, 2002, at 8B ("In May, Enron
told creditors it wanted to hew out a new holding company from Enron assets to salvage
the most value from its bankruptcy.").

2004

LETS MAKE IT OFFICIAL

1279

system. 1 Isolating the business units in a separate entity and
reducing the debtor to a mere holding company could also
decrease the stigma of both bankruptcy and the "Enron debacle,"
both of which management found were creating problems with
customers, vendors, and regulators." Aptly put by Enron and its
counsel, OpCo is a process for maximizing value.53
This two-stage process makes a great deal of sense in the
appropriate case, even in the case of Enron, where a group of
companies
were allegedly brought to bankruptcy
by
mismanagement, questionable accounting practices, insider
looting and/or trading, and even fraud.54 All of these alleged bad
51. Some earlier reviewers of this Article have objected to this technique of
removing the debtor's operations from the "fish bowl" of Chapter 11-a place where full
disclosure and intense scrutiny are the norm. New Millennium Research Council, A
WorldCom Phoenix: Is Bankruptcy a Tool for Competitive Advantage?, at
http://www.newmillenniumresearch.org/archive/summary-09272002.html (Sept. 27, 2002)
(reiterating that David Lynn "noted that under Chapter 11, a company must operate in a
fishbowl environment-with courts, a trustee, and creditors monitoring [its] every move").
The proposal in this Article is for a procedure to enable such a sale if appropriate under
the facts and circumstances of a particular case, not in every case. Bankruptcy courts and
professionals will be able to recognize when such a sale structure is appropriate and can
design safeguards to provide adequate protection for creditor interests. The structure
discussed here is not so very different from a sale to a third party of substantially all the
assets of a business where all or a substantial part of the purchase price is paid in stock,
promissory notes, or a contingent future interest in property. Nor is it that different from
a case consumed by a holding company whose operating company subsidiaries remain
outside of bankruptcy.
52. In the OpCo business plan, Enron management claimed that the "'[t]aint' of
bankruptcy tarnishes reputation," and that "[clustomers are often not willing to enter into
new long-term contracts with the Company [Enron]." OpCo Business Plan, supra note 41,
at 7. Management also claimed that the "Irlegulatory environment is difficult and can be
hostile," but that "OpCo can overcome regulators' tendencies to become distracted with
Enron bankruptcy matters, and thus deal more expeditiously with important Company
regulatory issues." Id. OpCo would also "be able to share commercial risk with joint
venture and alliance partners and employ less capital in the process." Id.
53. Id. at 6 ("[An OpCo § 363 sale... accomplishes two objectives for the Estate-it
mitigates risk and maximizes value."). The OpCo Business Plan claims that OpCo would
maximize value in the following ways: "Significantly More Value Combined vs. Separate
('Going Concern Value')"; "Provides for Value Recovery Opportunity as Market
Strengthens"; "Avoids Change in Control Provisions"; "Avoids 'Fire Sale' Perception by the
Market ('Hold' scenario is Acceptable)"; "Minimizes Bankruptcy Related Value Erosion";
"Capitalizes on Core Competencies"; and "Governance Remains in Control of Creditor's
Committee." Id.
54. See, e.g., Bill Murphy, "Isn't it disgusting?" Kopper Case Angers Many, HOUS.
CHRON., Sept. 1, 2002, at A.
Though long accustomed to negative news developments, current and
former Enron employees were nonetheless stunned and incensed by one exexecutive's admission that he had simply looted the company.
Others also were taken aback that Fastow and Kopper, brilliant financiers
and creators of labyrinthine strategies to hide debt, would take part in a
criminal enterprise as transparent as a kickback scheme.
Id.; see also WILLIAM C. POWERS ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL
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acts took place largely apart from the operations level of the
companies' businesses.55 Those core businesses would not benefit
from being hamstrung by the intricate, costly, and timeconsuming bankruptcy process. 6 While investigation of prior bad
INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 4 (2002).

This personal enrichment of Enron employees, however, was merely one
aspect of a deeper and more serious problem.... Many of the most significant
transactions apparently were designed to accomplish favorable financial
statement results, not to achieve bona fide economic objectives or to transfer
risk.
Other transactions were implemented-improperly we are informed by our
accounting advisors-to offset losses. They allowed Enron to conceal from the
market very large losses resulting from Enron's merchant investments by
creating an appearance that those investments were hedged-that is, that a
third party was obligated to pay Enron the amount of those losses-when in fact
that third party was simply an entity in which only Enron had a substantial
financial stake.
Id.; see also REPORT ON BOARD OF DIRECTORS, supranote 41, at 11.
Steady revelations since October 2001 have raised questions about numerous
aspects of the company's operations, from its extensive undisclosed off-the-books
dealings, often with companies run by Enron personnel, to an April 2002 SEC
filing announcing that the company's financial statements were unreliable and
the book value of its assets would have to be written-down as much as $24
billion, to its apparent intention to manipulate the California energy market, to
tax strategies which apparently included Enron's ordering its tax department to
produce billions of dollars in company earnings through the use of complex tax
shelters.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
55. Enron Examiner Neil Batson summarizes the accusations against Enron to
include everything from accounting irregularities to money laundering. The list does not
include, however, any accusation that Enron mismanaged or poorly ran its asset based
businesses at the operations level. See Batson Report, supra note 41, at 11 ("In the
months immediately following Enron's disclosures, allegations surfaced of securities
fraud, accounting irregularities, energy market price manipulation, money laundering,
breach of fiduciary duties, misleading financial information, ERISA violations, insider
trading, excessive compensation and wrongdoing by certain of Enron's bankers."). This is
essentially the argument management makes in urging the formation of OpCo. See OpCo
Business Plan, supra note 41.
However, Enron historically has had a substantial and profitable asset-based
business. These assets have the potential to provide the core of an integrated
energy company.
The financial collapse of Enron has not changed the fundamental nature of
its physical assets, which management believes are high quality, strategically
located and efficiently operated gas and power assets.
Id. at2.

56. See OpCo Business Plan, supranote 41, at 2.
The constraints of the chapter 11 process have severely hampered the ability of
operating management to compete in the marketplace. In order to avoid further
deterioration in the value of these assets, the Company believes it is now
necessary to consider options for separating these assets from the bankruptcy
process on an expedited basis.
OpCo minimizes the value erosion that will occur as Enron's assets,
customers, partners, employees and others are subjected to the uncertainty of
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acts and other circumstances could take place in the bankruptcy
case and other fora, 7 in order to maximize value for stakeholders,
it was imperative to separate the ongoing viable operating
businesses from the reorganizing debtors. 8 OpCo stock could
then be divided among the debtor companies and held for
appreciation or expected dividends or buybacks or, alternatively,
the stock could be sold on the open market to generate value to
fund distributions to creditors under plans of reorganization. 9 If
bankruptcy.
OpCo affords a convenient means to preserve the operations of the Estate's
most valuable assets. OpCo has a strong operating management team in place
with extensive regional and regulatory expertise that would be difficult to
replicate.
Operating under chapter 11 destroys value. Regulators are distracted,
customers are concerned, joint venture partners are distressed, company
personnel are dismayed, and many other stakeholders are each adversely
impacted by a chapter 11 reorganization. In addition, while in chapter 11, there
is no access to the capital markets. Without access to capital it is difficult to
compete. The assets of OpCo cannot operate profitably in a chapter 11
environment for an extended period of time and the risk of loss of customers,
employees, and in certain cases the right to operate, is high.
Id. at 2-4.
57. Indeed, ongoing litigation and investigations were some of the considerations
that led Enron management to conclude that "the probability of successful emergence
from a reorganization is limited." See id. at 4.
Enron's business, capital structure and related financings are extremely
complex. Many of the resultant financial structures are likely to be contested in
the bankruptcy court. This situation, coupled with the sheer magnitude of the
value of claims against the Enron Estate, and the significant number of debtors,
ensures a lengthy reconciliation process.
... Litigation associated with Enron's complexity and unprecedented issues
is not anticipated to be resolved in the near future. There are a substantial
number of lawsuits against the Estate for a variety of different reasons; likewise,
material litigation exists against others on behalf of the Estate.
... Unlike a typical chapter 11 proceeding, Enron's is clouded and made
more difficult and confusing by a series of investigations. The investigations by
regulatory, governmental and law enforcement agencies distract management
from operations and further concern partners, customers and employees of
Enron's still functioning power and gas businesses.

Id.

Given these factors, among others, Enron believes the probability of
successful emergence from a reorganization is limited.
Id. at 6.
The company believes that regardless of the outcome of the §[ 1363 bidding
process, value to the Estate is maximized through the prompt separation of
OpCo or its businesses from the Estate's chapter 11 burdens. The Company
believes the OpCo value proposition is compelling and that any lengthy delay in
separation will significantly deteriorate the going concern value of these assets.

58.

Id.
59. See Enron Hopes to Rise From the Ashes, supra note 46 ("By creating the new
company, creditors might be able to preserve value, presumably allowing for a disposal of
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such a strategy makes sense in the Enron situation,6 where
allegations of wrongdoing suggest that more, not less, oversight
may be needed, 1 in the appropriate garden-variety Chapter 11
case where the need for a heightened scrutiny is not present, the
potential efficiencies and benefits are obvious. 2
Because both a confirmed plan of reorganization and a
nonplan sale of substantially all the assets garner going concern
value (at least theoretically)," the least expensive and timediscrete assets or equity in the company as the market picks up again."); see also
Creditorsto Gain if Enron TradingArm Is Split Off, WKLY. PETROLEUM ARGUS, June 10,
2002, at 7 ("Last month, interim chief executive Steve Cooper proposed pooling $11 billion
of power and pipeline assets in the Americas into a new company, Opco, which could be
sold to a third party or spun off to creditors."); Steve Jordan, Unlike Parent Company
Enron, Omaha, Neb.-Based Natural Gas Firm Survives, Knight-RidderlTrib. Bus. News,
May 20, 2002 ("The company, with the interim name OpCo Energy Co., could belong to
Enron's creditors or be sold in a multibillion-dollar auction.... The creditors and the
Bankruptcy Court are evaluating the proposal and will ask for bids on all of OpCo or its
pieces.").
60. Whether the OpCo strategy is actually implemented in the Enron case is beside
the point. What is important is that its formulation and announcement recognized the
benefits of reorganization by sale and the value of removing operating assets from the
administrative costs and stigma of the bankruptcy estate.
61. See, e.g., Patty Reinert & Karen Masterson, Bankruptcy Triggers Legislative
Proposals: Congress Eyes Auditing, Retirement Bills, HouS. CHRON., Jan. 26, 2002, at
20A.
Reacting to the Enron-Arthur Andersen scandal, lawmakers returned to
Capitol Hill this week armed with legislation to protect investors and crack
down on corporate misconduct.
Some of the proposed legislation would tighten federal oversight of auditing
and retirement plan management, cap the amount of company stock employees
can hold in their 401(k)s and reduce conflicts of interest between businesses and
the accountants policing their books.
Id.
62. But see Daniel B. Bogart, Liability of Directors of Chapter 11 Debtors in
Possession: "Don'tLook Back-Something May Be Gaining on You," 68 AM. BANKR. L.J.
155, 159 (1994) ("[A] heightened scrutiny of DIP decisions creates the necessary
motivation for the DIP to avoid practices that may have led to the filing. This heightened
scrutiny encourages active monitoring of management behavior and fosters a proper level
of director and management loyalty."); id. at 236 ("The basic requirement of the
'heightened scrutiny' standard, applied to decisions of directors in prepetition corporate
control contests, should be considered the minimum necessary activity by a DIP in
meeting its duty of care.").
63. See Leonard P. Goldberger & Harvey L. Tepner, A Guide for Acquiring
Businesses in Bankruptcy, 10 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 521, 533 (2001).
Further, if an expedited transaction is required for strategic business purposes
or to preserve the going concern value of the entity being acquired, an acquirer
may not have to wait for the more lengthy plan confirmation process to occur.
A sale of assets is generally "out of the ordinary course of business" and
may be accomplished by either a negotiated private sale or by a public auction in
bankruptcy court.
Id.; see also Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: JudicialCompetence and
Statutory Design, 43 ARiz. L. REv. 559, 589 (2001) ("At the very least, the Bankruptcy
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consuming of the two processes is preferable, assuming that the
process in question is appropriately transparent64 and allows
Code seeks to facilitate reorganizations that preserve the going concern value of
businesses."); 9D AM, JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 2600, 164-65 (1999).
Chapter 11 enables a business to reorganize itself and continue as a going
concern; it allows the debtor to restructure its business debts so that the
business can continue to operate and creditors can receive the going concern
value of estate assets as opposed to the liquidation value, which is generally
considered to be far less.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Baird & Rasmussen, supranote 3, at 777-78.
Even if control rights are not allocated coherently, there is still no need for
a collective forum that decides the fate of the firm if the firm can be sold in the
marketplace as a going concern. The rise of such markets further undercuts the
need for a traditional law of corporate reorganization. Indeed, the ability of
modern bankruptcy judges to take advantage of these markets explains many of
the Chapter 11 filings in recent years.
Id.; see also In re 4 C Solutions, Inc., 289 B.R. 354, 365-66 (Bankr. C.D. I. 2003).
The likelihood that the debtor will find a "white knight" is almost entirely
dependent upon the saleability of iWarranty, the true value of which is unknown
and the subject of wide-ranging speculation. With two modules nearly marketready, the debtor is entitled to use the protections afforded by Chapter 11, for a
reasonable period of time, to facilitate its search for an investor/
purchaser.... This in all likelihood, is the only hope that the debtor has of
preserving its going concern value and maximizing the property available for
distribution to creditors.
Id.; see also In re Brookfield Clothes, Inc., 31 B.R. 978, 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
Simply put, the wasting asset in this instance may be characterized as the
"going concern" value of the fully stopped business.
In sum, we conclude that an "emergency sale" of substantially all of the
assets of a debtor-in-possession is permitted under § 363(b) and that Brookfield
met its burden of showing sufficiently exigent circumstances to warrant the
immediate sale to Zion.
Id.
64. See, e.g., In re Eng'g Prods., Inc., 121 B.R. 246, 249 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1990) ("Of
paramount importance is the existence of good faith--of full disclosure and fair dealing on
the part of all interested parties."); In re Indus. Valley Refrigeration & Air Conditioning
Suppliers, Inc., 77 B.R. 15, 21 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
We therefore conclude that the standards for allowance of a preconfirmation sale pursuant to § 363(b)(1) are that the sale proponent must show
not only that there is both a "sound business purpose" why the sale should be
allowed to take place outside of the ordinary course of Subchapter II of Chapter
11, taking into account the factors suggested by Lionel, but that the proponent
must also make a strong showing that all of the requirements for any § 363(b)(1)
sale are met.... These elements are the provision of accurate and reasonable
notice; a showing that the price to be paid is adequate, i.e., fair and reasonable;
and establishing that "good faith," i.e., the absence of any lucrative deals with
insiders, is present. The strength of the showing necessary to satisfy each of
these elements is heightened by the fact that the protections of Subehapter II of
Chapter 11 are absent, and such agreements are typically considered on an
expedited basis, thus impeding interested parties from making the complete
investigation and amassing of contrary evidence which otherwise would be
possible.
Id. Some courts have held that appropriate notice is a requirement for avoiding a
violation of creditors' due process rights. See, e.g., In re F.A. Potts & Co., 86 B.R. 853,
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parties in interest to examine the transaction and voice their
support or objections in a meaningful way."5 Further, rather than
involving the bankruptcy court in the difficult process of valuing
a business, evaluating a business plan, and generally speculating
on the future of the enterprise based on the briefs of attorneys
and the reports of hired-gun professional experts," the nonplan
860-61 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988), affd, 93 B.R. 62 (E.D. Pa.), aft'd, 891 F.2d 280 (3d Cir.
1989).
Appearing more than 130 times in the Rules, the term "notice" and the related
procedures are a cornerstone of bankruptcy practice. The notice requirement is
the fulcrum we use to balance a debtor's title 11 protections against the Fifth
Amendment guarantee that creditors will not be deprived of "life, liberty or
property" without "due process of the law."
Id. Concerns about transparency and disclosure have led some courts to express
reservations about some types of nonplan asset sales. See, e.g., In re N. At. Millwork
Corp., 155 B.R. 271, 283 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993).
The failure on the part of the Debtor, Creditors' Committee, and Fleet to disclose
the extent and gross value of preference claims (over $3 million) in the Joint
Motion to Sell and, particularly, at the May 28, 1991 hearing, is precisely why
sales of all assets are disfavored, at least by this Court, in the absence of full
disclosure, a plan, and the vote of all creditors entitled to vote on a plan.
Id.
65. See, e.g., In re Eng'g Prods., 121 B.R. at 249 ("In addition, due process
requirements must be addressed. Persons in interest must be given adequate notice of the
sale and an opportunity to be heard and object."); In re Naron & Wagner, Chartered, 88
B.R. 85, 88 (Bankr. D. Md. 1988).
Basic to the structure of the Bankruptcy Code is that debtors are provided
a fresh start through liquidation, adjustment of debts, or reorganization, while
creditors and other parties in interest are protected by the requirement they
receive notice and an opportunity to be heard on matters which affect their
positions.
Id.
66. Courts are simply not well equipped for these tasks. Nor is the adversarial
system of traditional American litigation, which tends to leave the court faced with two or
more extreme positions on any disputed issue, from which it may choose one or adopt its
own middle ground. Again, the market is the best alternative mechanism for resolving the
question of value, and the court and the parties' efforts should be directed at perfecting
the market to enhance its operation rather than simulating or forecasting it. See Lucian
Arye Bebchuck & Jesse M. Fried, A New Approach to Valuing Secured Claims in
Bankruptcy, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2386, 2388 (2001) ("One of the most difficult problems in
business bankruptcies is valuing the individual assets...."); John M. Czarnetzky, Time,
Uncertainty,and the Law of CorporateReorganizations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2939, 2993
(1999).
It ought not to be the province of a government official-though that official is
stipulated to be diligent, intelligent, and honest-to assess the economic value or
viability of entrepreneurial plans. The bankruptcy judge is ill-equipped to
process the information necessary to make decisions regarding the "feasibility" of
a proposed plan, or to make any judgments about value beyond setting the
liquidation price.
Id.; see also Lisa Hill Fenning, Dicta:Business Management: The Heart of Chapter11, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 1996, at 35 ("Whether a confirmable plan is likely depends largely
upon business risks and probabilities. Most bankruptcy judges are understandably
uneasy about making determinations of business viability, lacking the background and
training to assess those risks and probabilities.").
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sale process allows the court to concentrate on tasks for which it
is well suited. These involve review and approval of the
procedure for exposing a debtor's assets to the market, including
adequate disclosure, appropriate notice and the opportunity for
objecting parties or competing bidders to be heard, and generally
ensuring a fair sale process and resolving legal disputes. 7 The
market can then function to optimize value."

67.
Czarnetzky, supra note 66, at 2994.
[Ilt might fairly be asked: What should be the role of the court in a chapter 11
case? Simply put, the bankruptcy court should do what any court does bestsettle the legal disputes brought before it. Chapter 11 should limit such disputes
to the extent possible to those that safeguard (but do not meddle with) the
process itself. Such litigation would, of course, include disputes over some of the
core legal constructs necessary to the bankruptcy process-for example, the
bankruptcy estate, order and priority of distribution and litigation over the
viability and scope of claims. In sum, the court should recognize that a chapter
11 primarily is not a lawsuit, it is a forced workout of a troubled business. As
such, chapter 11 ought to restrict the court's role as much as possible to
questions of law, and permit the business people to take care of business.
Id. In the Author's view, replacing the plan process with a sale process would be even
more preferable as it would go far in eliminating the opportunity for insiders and others
with superior knowledge or lower cost of obtaining knowledge from influencing the
reorganization process to their own benefit. The common practice of granting the
executives and directors that presided over a business's slide into financial ruin with
large "incentive" and "retention" bonuses, and including releases of all liability for those
nondebtor insiders in plans of reorganization, are examples of these abuses. See George
W. Kuney, The Hijacking of Chapter 11 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Houston Law Review) [hereinafter Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 111. The Author believes
that de facto replacement of the plan process may be the end result if a nonplan sale
procedure is enacted as a result of "natural selection" between the two processes. Because
of lower transaction costs and greater efficiencies, businesses reorganizing by nonplan
sale are likely to be the "strong" that survive. See Charles J. Tabb, The Future of Chapter
11, 44 S.C. L. REv. 791, 850 (1993) ("A sale establishes a precise and hopefully accurate
value and can often be accomplished much more rapidly and inexpensively than a
negotiated plan. An actual sale neatly bifurcates the issues of how the assets should be
deployed and how the value of those assets should be distributed to claimants.").
See Brett Rappaport & Joni Green, CalvinballCannot Be Played on This Court:
68.
The Sanctity of Auction Procedures in Bankruptcy, 11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 189, 193
(2002) ("Public auctions are preferred over private auctions to ensure a market price, so
that optimal return can be realized for creditors."). Indeed, some commentators have
argued that the market is now sophisticated enough to make Chapter 11 reorganization
an anachronism. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 755-56.
Today's investors allocate control rights among themselves through
elaborate and sophisticated contracts that already anticipate financial distress.
In the presence of these contracts, a law of corporate reorganizations is largely
unnecessary.
... Today, both small and large firms can be sold as going concerns, inside
of bankruptcy and out. The ability to sell entire firms and divisions eliminates
the need for a collective forum in which the different players must come to an
agreement about what should happen to the assets. That decision can be left to
the new owners.
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Further, there is very little in the way of reorganization that
cannot be accomplished through a sale.69 As examples of what can
be accomplished through either a nonplan sale or a plan,"
consider the traditionally plan-based transactional possibilities
contained in § 1123(a)(5) covering what a plan may provide and
that are easily accomplished by sales of substantially all the
assets of the business: sales to new or preexisting entities,7'
merger or consolidation with another entity," sale of assets
subject to or free and clear of liens,7 3 satisfaction of liens,7 4 or sale
of substantially all the assets of the debtor.75 Issuance of
securities in the reorganized debtor is the primary exception, 6
and given that the process for issuance of securities under a
confirmed plan is already greatly foreshortened and simplified
when compared to that under the otherwise applicable securities
law,77 there is little need to further shorten that process.
Interestingly, very few statutory amendments are needed to
put an explicit nonplan sale procedure into effect. The key is to
properly define a "nonplan sale" and then to amend the
substantive statutes and rules involved, providing a process for
such a sale that mimics the plan confirmation process enough to
satisfy due and appropriate process requirements at the least
possible expense in terms of time and money." By using a process
69. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)-(b) (2000) (detailing what a plan shall and may do).
70. This excludes matters directly affecting the debtor's relations with and
distributions to its creditors that shall or may be included in a plan. See id. § 1123(a)(1)
(requiring plan to designate classes of claims); id. § 1123(a)(2) (requiring plan to specify
unimpaired classes); id. § 1123(a)(3) (requiring plan to specify treatment of impaired
classes); id. § 1123(a)(4) (requiring plan to provide for same treatment among claims in a
class); id. § 1123(a)(5)(F) (requiring the "cancellation or modification of any indenture or
similar instrument"); id. § 1123(a)(5)(G) (requiring the cure or waiver of any default); id.
§ 1123(a)(5)(H) (changing terms of outstanding securities); id. § 1123(a)(5)(1) (amending
the debtor's charter); id. § 1123(a)(5)(J) (addressing the issuance of securities); id.
§ 1123(a)(6) (addressing the amendment of debtor's charter regarding nonvoting
securities); id. § 1123(b)(1) (allowing plan to impair, or not, any class); id. § 1123(b)(3)
(allowing plan to provide for the settlement or prosecution of a claim or cause of action);
id. § 1123(b)(5) (allowing the plan to modify rights of secured creditors). This also
excludes matters that would be addressed in a Chapter 7 case to which Chapter 11 was
converted. See id. § 726 (detailing Chapter 7 distribution system); id. § 1112(a) (allowing
the conversion of Chapter 11 case to Chapter 7 case).
71. See id. § 1123(a)(5)(B).
72. See id. § 1123(a)(5)(C).
73. See id. § 1123(a)(5)(D).
74. See id. § 1123(a)(5)(E).
75. See id. § 1123(b)(4).
76. See id. § 1123(a)(5)(J).
77. See George W. Kuney, Going Public Via Chapter11: 11 U.S.C. Sections 1125(a)
and 1145, 23 CAL. BANKR. J. 3, 13 (1996).
78. Refer to Part III infra. See Kuney, MisinterpretationsI, supra note 2, at 272-82
(analyzing the effects of reorganization by sale rather than by plan on parties in interest
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that is procedurally parallel to the plan confirmation process,
this nonplan sale process would be familiar to, and draw upon,
well-developed precedent from bankruptcy courts and
practitioners nationwide. But by focusing on just the disposition
of certain assets in the process, rather than the plethora of
issues, transactions, and distributions implicated in a full-blown
plan of reorganization, the process should be efficient enough to
avoid becoming the murky, sticky bog that the Chapter 11 plan
process often becomes."
Finally, rather than confine the nonplan sale process to
Chapter 11 cases, it should be included in other chapters, and
especially Chapter 7 cases, to provide a uniform process for
Chapter 7 trustees to sell a business as a going concern. The
amendments would also make it clear that a Chapter 7 or other
trustee can sell assets free and clear of interests and claims,
rather than just interests, a term that is not defined under the
Bankruptcy Code.
III. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 0
This Part proposes amendments to the Bankruptcy Code and
the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and their sequence in order to
implement a nationally uniform and comprehensive process for
§ 363(b) and (f) sales. Providing explicit statutory authority for
these sales will remove whatever objections may be made based
upon the lack of such provisions under the existing statute.81
and suggesting that unsecured, nonadministrative priority creditors are probably
damaged by the less-involved process for sale rather than plan proposal and
confirmation); see also D.S.C. BANKR. R. 6004 (detailing extensive disclosures required for
nonplan sales in first sixty days of case).
79. See Kuney, MisinterpretationsI, supra note 2, at 242 n.30 (describing the
murky, sticky bog described in the text and evolution of more lenient nonplan sale
requirements in response to recognition of that bog). As the Appendix of this Article
demonstrates, the courts have turned to their local rules to address the lack of legislative
guidance for the prevalent practice of reorganization by nonplan sale. The treatment of
these sales by local rules has been of various degrees and various rigidity and vigor,
perhaps reflecting a proper judicial reluctance to engage in what is essentially a
legislative function. Refer to Appendix infra. It would appear that the local rules are
developed by the courts to fill gaps in the statute and national procedural rules left by
Congress and the Rules Committee and either made necessary or requested by the
attorneys practicing before the courts involved. If these other bodies acted to fill the gaps,
the local rules-beyond general practices regarding how to place a motion on a particular
judge's calendar and the like-would not be needed.
80. Given that Chapter 11 is a creature of statute, the easiest way of demonstrating
this Article's proposal is to present blacklined amendments to the existing Code. It is
surprising how little in the way of amendment implementing this proposal would require.
Additions to the statute are shown with underlined text. [Deleted text is enclosed in
square brackets.]
81. See Kuney, MisinterpretationsI, supra note 2, at 286-87 (asserting that action
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Explicit statutory authority would also promote national
uniformity and predictability for nonplan sales of substantially
all the assets of an estate or a business. Implementation of this
uniform process would help to level out the disproportionate

impact of preplan sales on various constituencies.82 These goals
are desirable considering that the nonplan sale method of
effectuating a reorganization or exiting from Chapter 11 is the
only method not covered specifically by the statute. Conversion to
Chapter 7, dismissal, and plan confirmation are all provided for,
and the result has been the development of a nationwide body of
authority addressing their permutations." Given the importance
of nonplan sale practice today, it makes no sense to have this
fourth route out of Chapter 11 undefined except by the
patchwork of local rules formulated on the local district and
division levels nationwide.
The first amendment is a new definition in § 101 for this
procedure, a nonplan sale:
4 101(40A) "nonplan sale" means a sale of all or a
substantial portion of the assets of the estate
pursuant to section 363(b) and, if appropriate,
section 363(f) of this title, other than pursuant
to a confirmed plan in a case under chapter 9.
11, 12, or 13 of this title.
Next, the power of the court section of the statute should be
amended to give bankruptcy judges the whip hand to control
cases by ordering a sale.84
by Congress and the courts is needed to overcome the dominant interpretation of § 363(f)
"that Congress did not intend"); Kuney, Misinterpretations II, supra note 2, at 331
(viewing court action as necessary to return to the original intent of §§ 363 and 1141).
82. See Kuney, MisinterpretationsI, supra note 2, at 273-82 (analyzing the impact
of the rise in reorganization via § 363 sales as opposed to reorganization via plans of
reorganization and finding that the trend benefits secured creditors and priority creditors
to the detriment of junior creditors, equity holders, suppliers and customers, the
surrounding community and the public, and slow-moving governmental units).
83. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1112, 1129 (2000) (addressing procedures for conversion to Chapter
7, dismissal, and plan confirmation).
84. See generally Miller, supra note 13, at 438-40 (noting that the 1994
amendments to § 105 restored bankruptcy judges to many of their pre-Code
administrative powers and concluding that this causes a laudable change). Under the
current § 105 (as amended in 1994), although the court is empowered to take any action
or make any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders
or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process, and can also hold status conferences and set
deadlines for assumption or rejection of contracts or the plan confirmation process, the
court has no ability to directly set a deadline for or order a sale. See 11 U.S.C. § 105. Of
course, an indirect deadline can be set by the court sua sponte or on motion ordering
dismissal or conversion of a case if a sale does not take place within a particular period of
time. See id. § 105(d). Thus, this amendment merely gives the court the power to do
directly what it can currently do indirectly.
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§ 105(d)(2)(B). Power of court
(d) The court, on its own motion or on the request of a party
in interest, may(2) unless inconsistent with another provision of this
title or with applicable Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, issue an order at any such conference
prescribing such limitations and conditions as the court
deems appropriate to ensure that the case is handled
expeditiously and economically, including an order
that(B) in a case under Chapter 11 of this title(vii) sets a date by which the debtor or trustee
shall seek approval of a nonplan sale or notice
of a nonplan sale: or
(viii) sets a date on which there will be a
nonplan sale and specifies the appropriate
form of notice of that sale and the appropriate
means of dissemination of such notice.
Turning to the heart of the matter, § 363 also would need to be
amended. In order to achieve the goal of making the sale process
parallel to the plan process as an exit strategy for Chapter 11, it is
appropriate to focus on adequate disclosure, notice, and approval of
the sale. Thus, it appears prudent to borrow from the plan and
disclosure statement process to import § 1125(a)'s "adequate
information" standard s6 and its established precedent."

85.

11 U.S.C. § 1125(a) provides:

(1) "adequate information" means information of a kind, and in sufficient
detail, as far as is reasonably practicable in light of the nature and history of the
debtor and the condition of the debtor's books and records, that would enable a
hypothetical reasonable investor typical of holders of claims or interests of the
relevant class to make an informed judgment about the plan, but adequate
information need not include such information about any other possible or
proposed plan; ....

Id. Of course, under this proposal for explicit recognition of nonplan sales, § 1125 would
itself have to be amended to reflect its applicability to nonplan sales as well as plans of
reorganization. Refer to notes 113-15 infra and accompanying text.
86. Weil, Gotshal & Manges, Reorganizing FailingBusinesses: A Comprehensive
Review and Analysis of FinancialRestructuring and Careful Reorganization 11-9 (ABA
2003) ("Notice of a sale should provide adequate information about the proposed sale
because it is the functional substitute for the information that would be required in a
disclosure statement if the transaction were proposed under a chapter 11 plan.").
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§ 363. Use, sale, or lease of property
(b)(1) The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use,
sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of
business, property of the estate. If a nonplan sale is
proposed, the court shall only approve the sale after
appropriate dissemination of notice of the sale that has
been approved, after notice and a hearing, by the court
as containing adequate information as that term is
defined in section 1125(a) of this title.
Current practice in sales of substantially all the assets of a
debtor is often to use a two-step, two-hearing or two-opportunityfor-a-hearing sale procedure.87 The first step is presentation of an
offer to purchase the assets. The offer takes the form of an asset
purchase agreement containing a request that at the first
hearing the court (1) conditionally approve the sale, the
overbidding process, the means and manner of notice for the sale,
the process for objecting to the sale, and (2) set a second hearing
at which to consider the merits of the sale proposal and any
objections, bids, or other comments received from parties in
extent. 8 In the second step, at the second hearing, objections to
the sale and any overbids that have been received are
entertained and the court either approves or denies the motion to
sell.8" This is the general outline of the process nationwide, but
there is great diversity in practice from one district to another. °
Because the Code and the Rules were not drafted with a nonplan
sale of substantially all the assets of a business in mind as a
Chapter 11 reorganization strategy, 91 no cohesive regimen or
87.
Although the process usually has at least two steps, as described, it may require
more than two hearings, especially when multiple bidders appear offering differing mixes
of consideration as the purchase price, and careful evaluation of the highest and best
purchase price must take place. It is also possible for the sale to be approved in a single
hearing or with no hearing at all. See Kuney, MisinterpretationsI, supra note 2, at 239
n.17. In the large corporate case, however, at least two hearings are typically held due to
the interest of various constituencies and potential alternative bidders in the sale and
business opportunity that it presents.
88.
See Donald S. Bernstein, PracticalGuide to Acquiring the Troubled Company,
SC78 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY 317, 330 (1998).
If the acquisition will occur while the target is in Chapter 11... notice of
the proposed sale must be sent to creditors and other parties-in-interest and the
Bankruptcy Court will hold a hearing to consider the proposed sale .... The
terms of the buyer's offer will be publicized, "higher and better" offers typically
will be solicited and objections to the sale and any competing offers will be
considered ....

Id.
89.
Id.
90.
Refer to Appendix infra (collecting and analyzing local rules relating to § 363(b)
and () sales nationwide).
91.
See Kuney, MisinterpretationsI, supra note 2, at 242 n.30.
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bright-line rules regarding the substance or procedure of such a
sale have emerged on the following questions: what is proper
notice of the sale"2 and opportunity to object or overbid;"9 what are
proper overbidding procedures and limitations;94 and, when and
what kind of break-up fees and other stalking-horse protections95
are appropriate. Formalizing nonplan sale practice and
importing the concept of "adequate information" from § 1125
should increase uniformity and the understanding of the
standards to be applied to address procedural and substantive
concerns.
In the same section of the Code (§ 363), subsection (f) should
be amended to (1) make it clear that nonplan sales can be free
and clear of claims as well as interests and (2) augment the five
conditions for sales free and clear with an explicit reference to
the adequate protection standard of § 363(e). 6 This will also
92. See In re Ex-Cel Concrete Co., 178 B.R. 198, 200, 202-05 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995)
(engaging in lengthy discussion and analysis to determine if notice of a proposed asset
sale provided to counsel for a secured creditor in an unrelated matter who was on
vacation at the time constituted "effective notice" and finding, ultimately, that it did not);
In re Moberg Trucking, Inc., 112 B.R. 362, 363 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990) (holding that lack of
notice to federal government lienholder made § 363(m) mootness argument unavailable
upon appeal). See generally Philip A. Schovanec, Comment, Bankruptcy: The Sale of
Property Under Section 363: The Validity of Sales Conducted Without ProperNotice, 46
OKLA. L. REv. 489, 498-503 (1993) (reviewing notice requirements of Bankruptcy Code
§§ 102(1) and 363 and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 2002 and 6004).
93. See C.R. Bowles & John Egan, The Sale of the Century or a Fraudon Creditors?:
The Fiduciary Duty of Trustees and Debtors in Possession Relating to the "Sale" of a
Debtor's Assets in Bankruptcy, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 781, 805-36 (1998) (discussing
overbidding issues from a practical and ethical perspective).
94. Id. at 805-08 (discussing overbidding procedures and incentives).
95. See In re Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 166 B.R. 908, 912-13 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994)
(discussing varying standards by which to evaluate whether or not to approve break-up
fee provisions); Bowles & Egan, supra note 93, at 808-27 (summarizing then-current
judicial analysis of bidding incentives in bankruptcy cases); Robert T. Kugler & Douglas
R. Boettge, In Search of the Elusive Break-Up Fee, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2000, at
14 (reviewing standards for approval of break-up fees including the "modified business
judgment standard," the "'best interest of the estate'" test, and the "§ 503(b) standard");
Bruce A. Markel, The Case Against Breakup Fees in Bankruptcy, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349,
352-80 (1992) (collecting and analyzing cases addressing break-up fees; the article
remains fresh and relevant over eleven years after publication); Houlihan Lokey Howard
& Zukin, 1999 Transaction Termination Fee Study (Apr. 2000) (privately published, copy
on file with Author) (summarizing termination fees that were part of 322 announced
transactions in calendar year 1999 of publicly traded target companies with an aggregate
transaction value of at least $50 million and finding that those fees ranged from 0.2% to
8.2% with a mean and median of 2.9%).
96. Kuney, MisinterpretationsI, supra note 2, at 238-45, 261-67 (illustrating that
in practice, sales are free and clear of claims and interests). One reviewer of a draft of this
Article reacted extremely negatively to the proposed revision of § 363(f). He read it even
more broadly than is intended and passed over the cross-references to § 363(b), (c), and
(e). This led him to believe that, under the proposed language, a trustee could sell, for
example, land owned by a nondebtor over which the debtor had, prepetition, only an
easement. This is not correct for at least two reasons. First, the proposed amended statute
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specifically authorize Chapter 7 trustees to sell free and clear of
claims and interests, 7 a desirable result if maximization of
realized asset value in Chapter 7 cases is the goal.98 When
is not a stand-alone power of sale. Rather, it refers to sales of property under § 363(b) and
(c). Both of those subsections speak only to sales of "property of the estate." 11 U.S.C.
§ 363(b) (2000) ("The trustee... may ... sell.., other than in the ordinary course of
business, property of the estate."); id. § 363(c) ("[Tlhe trustee may enter into transactions,
including the sale... of property of the estate, in the ordinary course of business. .. ").
In the posited hypothetical, the land is not property of the estate, see 11 U.S.C. § 541
(defining property of the estate broadly, but confining it to prepetition property interests
of the debtor, property interests of the debtor's spouse, property recovered by the trustee
under various sections of the Code, certain postpetition property interests that the debtor
may acquire, proceeds and products of property of the estate, and any interest in property
that the estate acquires postpetition), and therefore the trustee could not sell it. Even in
the case of a § 363(f)(4) sale of property over which there is a bona fide dispute, and
therefore could conceivably be a sale of property that is not property of the estate, courts
require a showing that the debtor or estate has an interest in the property in question
before exercising their sale jurisdiction. Kuney, MisinterpretationsI, supra note 2, at 25051 (stating this proposition and citing authorities). Second, even if the trustee could
somehow manage to sell the land, the trustee could only do so if able to provide the
owners and others holding property interests in the land with adequate protection of their
interests. This is true even without the specific reference to § 363(e) included in the
proposed amendment, see 11 U.S.C. § 363(e), but the explicit cross-reference makes it
even more clear, precisely to prevent this overbroad interpretation.
97. See Kuney, MisinterpretationsI, supranote 2, at 261 & n.101.
98. In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d 283, 292 (3d Cir. 2003).
"An additional difficulty with the plaintiffs position is that it would
seriously impair the trustee's ability to liquidate the bankrupt's estate. If the
trustee in a liquidation sale is not able to transfer title to the bankrupt's assets
free of all claims, including civil rights claims, prospective purchasers may be
unwilling to pay a fair price for the property, leaving less to distribute to the
creditors."
Id. (quoting Forde v. Kee-Lox Mfg. Co., 437 F. Supp. 631, 633-34 (W.D.N.Y. 1977)). Here
the Third Circuit solves the problem by reliance upon practice rather than the language of
the statute. Refer to note 7 supra (discussing reactions of practitioners to the suggestion
that nonplan sales free and clear of claims were not authorized by the Code). This is
similar to the same court's approach in Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of
Cybergenics Corp. ex rel. Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548 (3d Cir. 2003), where,
in a lengthy opinion, it held that nontrustees and nondebtors in possession may be
authorized to bring avoidance actions despite lack of express authorization by the Code,
again validating a practice rather than hewing to the language of the statute. The opinion
states at one point:
While the question in Hartford Underwriters [U.S. Supreme Court precedent
seemingly mandating a holding opposite from the one adopted by the
Cybergenics majority, see 530 U.S. 1 (2000)] was one of a nontrustee's right
unilaterally to circumvent the Code's remedial scheme, the issue before us today
concerns a bankruptcy court's equitablepower to craft a remedy when the Code's
envisioned scheme breaks down. We believe that Sections 1109(b), 1103(c)(5),
and 503(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code evince Congress's approval of derivative
avoidance actions by creditors' committees, and that bankruptcy courts'
equitable powers enable them to authorize such suits as a remedy in cases where
a debtor-in-possession unreasonably refuses to pursue an avoidance claim. Our
conclusion is consistent with the received wisdom that "[nlearly all courts
considering the issue have permitted creditors' committees to bring actions in
the name of the debtor in possession if the committee is able to establish" that
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Congress is alerted to a need to fix the Bankruptcy Code, it
knows just how to do so.
(f) The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) or (c)
of this section free and clear of any claim or interest to or in
such property of an entity other than the estate subject to
the provisions of subsection (e) above only if-<current list of
5 conditions for sale>.
With the amendment of § 363(b) and () to allow nonplan
sales of the business free and clear of interests and claims, Rule
4001 will also require revision. Again, in order to reduce
confusion and draw upon an existing body of law, the procedure
for approving nonplan sales should, as much as possible, parallel
that for obtaining credit under Rule 4001(c).99
the debtor is neglecting its fiduciary duty.
Id. at 552-53 (alteration in original). Regardless of one's conclusion on the merits of
Cybergenics, this passage is not the most convincing. The easy fix for the problem of a
debtor in possession that neglects its fiduciary duties and unreasonably refuses to pursue
an avoidance action is appointment of a trustee for cause, in this case, neglect of fiduciary
duty. Drawing on an analogy suggested by a group of law professors, the Cybergenics
court characterizes the trustee remedy as substituting a chainsaw for a scalpel. Id. at 577.
But this is the mechanism that the Code provides. The fix, if one is to be had, should be
had in Congress, not the courts, as the dissent in Cybernetics recognized. Id. at 580-87
(Fuentes, J., dissenting).
Perhaps the Cybernetics court could have better approached the issue by
observing that the plain language Justices on the Supreme Court can approach reading
the Code with the ease and imagination of a computer, but that, in the trenches, the Code
as written does not always work. It could then have either refused to extend Hartford
Underwritersbeyond its specific facts or could have followed that precedent and included
a statement to the effect that it had to do so based upon stare decisis but, if writing on a
clean slate, it would not do so. This would then leave the matter where it should be
addressed, in Congress or the Supreme Court. Both bodies are properly empowered to
make corrections to applicable law, Congress to the Code, the Supreme Court to its own
precedent.
On June 26, 2003, Congressman Conyers introduced H.R. 2609 with the
somewhat confusing claim that it is a bill "[t]o amend title 11, United States Code, to
provide for the avoidance of certain transfers, and the alternate prosecution of certain
actions, relating to certain retirement benefits." H.R. 2609, 108th Cong. (2003). Far from
being confined to actions involving retirement benefits, the bill contains a section that
would provide firm legislative authority for the Cybergenics result:
If the trustee consents or fails to commence a proceeding authorized under
section 506, 543, 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, 550, 552, 553, or 724, on request of a
party in interest or a committee of creditors appointed under section 1102 of this
title, after notice and a hearing, the court may authorize such party in interest
or committee of creditors to commence and prosecute such proceeding if the court
finds that commencing and prosecuting such proceeding is in the best interest of
the estate and for the benefit of the estate.
Id. § 2.
99. After all, obtaining secured credit is very similar to a sale, albeit a contingent
sale. When a debtor grants a lien or security interest in exchange for loaned funds, the
debtor is transferring a present property interest to the lender (the lien or the pledge)
that confers a contingent future ownership right as part of the consideration to obtain
funds. Should the debtor fail to repay the loan according to its terms, the creditor's rights

1294

HOUSTONLAW REVIEW

[40:5

Rule 4001(c). Obtaining Credit or Approving a Nonplan
Sale.
(1) Motion; Service. A motion for authority to obtain
credit or to approve a nonplan sale shall be made in
accordance with Rule 9014 and shall be served on any
committee elected pursuant to § 705 or appointed
pursuant to § 1102 of the Code or its authorized agent,
or, if the case is a chapter 9 municipality case or a
chapter 11 reorganization case and no committee of
unsecured creditors has been appointed pursuant to
§ 1102, on the creditors included on the list filed
pursuant to Rule 1007(d), and on such other entities as
the court may direct. The motion shall be accompanied
by a copy of the agreement.
(2) Hearing. The court may commence a final hearing
on a motion for authority to obtain credit or to approve
a nonplan sale no earlier than 30 [151 days after service
of the motion. If the motion so requests, the court may
conduct a hearing before such 30 [151 day period
expires, but the court may authorize the obtaining of
credit or the nonplan sale only to the extent necessary
to avoid immediate and irreparable harm to the estate
pending a final hearing.
(3) Notice. Notice of hearing pursuant to this
subdivision shall be given to the parties on whom
service of the motion is required by paragraph (1) of
this subdivision and to such other entities as the court
may direct.
Rule 4001(d). Agreement Relating to Relief From the
Automatic Stay, Prohibiting or Conditioning the Use, Sale,
or Lease of Property, Providing Adequate Protection, Use of
Cash Collateral, and Obtaining Credit or Approving a
Nonplan Sale.
(1) Motion; Service. A motion for approval of an
agreement (A) to provide adequate protection, (B) to
prohibit or condition the use, sale, or lease of property,
(C) to modify or terminate the stay provided for in
§ 362, (D) to use cash collateral, [or] (E) between the
debtor and an entity that has a lien or interest in
property of the estate pursuant to which the entity
consents to the creation of a lien senior or equal to the
to the collateral become present possessory ownership rights subject to any senior liens or
other interests through the process of foreclosure. The transaction thus can be

characterized as a conditional sale of the collateral or an interest in the collateral.
Understanding that hypothecation and outright sale involve similar considerations
suggests that the same procedures may be used to approve each type of transaction.
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entity's lien or interest in such property, or (F) to
approve a nonplan sale shall be served on any
committee elected pursuant to § 705 or appointed
pursuant to § 1102 of the Code or its authorized agent,
or, if the case is a chapter 9 municipality case or a
chapter 11 reorganization case and no committee of
unsecured creditors has been appointed pursuant to
§ 1102, on the creditors included on the list filed
pursuant to Rule 1007(d), and on such other entities as
the court may direct. The motion shall be accompanied
by a copy of the agreement.
Presently, Rule 4001(c)(2) provides for a fifteen-day notice
period for a final hearing on a motion to obtain credit. °° However,
the court can hold and make rulings based on an interim hearing
with as little as one day's notice (or less) 1 ' in order "to avoid
immediate and irreparable harm to the estate pending a final
hearing." 2 Immediate and irreparable harm in the context of
Rule 4001(c)(2) is a broad and elastic standard-in essence,
anything that could threaten the loss of the business, including
the threatened loss of consumer, customer, employee, and/or
vendor confidence-and is often ubiquitous in Chapter 11
cases.0 3 Thus, the Author recommends that the fifteen-day period
of Rule 4001(c)(2) be lengthened to thirty days to allow better
opportunity for all affected parties to review and respond to the
motion to obtain credit or for approval of the sale before the
interim order can become final.' 4 The loan or sale documents and
100.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(c)(2).
101.
See, e.g., In re Payless Cashways, Inc., 268 B.R. 543, 544-45 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
2001). In Payless, the day the case was filed, the debtor filed a motion to grant
administrative expense priority to critical vendors for postpetition credit, which the court,
sua sponte, treated as a motion to obtain credit, heard and preliminarily granted that day
on "emergency notice" under Rule 4001(c)(2). Id.; Marcus Cole, "DelawareIs Not a State".
Are We Witnessing JurisdictionalCompetition in Bankruptcy, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1845,
1910 app. 1 (2002) (reprinting Open Letter from Judge Peter J. Walsh to the Delaware
Bankruptcy Bar that discusses first day DIP financing orders under Rule 4001(c)(2)); see
also 4 WILLIAM L. NORTON, NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. 2d § 87:18, at 87-88 (2002)
(collecting and analyzing cases).
102.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(c)(2).
103.
See, e.g., In re Payless Cashways, 268 B.R. at 547 (implying that debtor's need
for lumber from critical vendors in order to supply customers who would otherwise go
elsewhere for all their construction products satisfied the immediate and irreparable
harm standard under Rule 4001(c)(2)); In re Pan Am. Corp., Nos. 91 CIV. 8319 (LMM) to
91 CIV. 8324 (LMM), 1992 WL 154200, at *4, *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 1992) (holding that
potential loss of routes and passenger confidence satisfied immediate and irreparable
harm standard); In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc., 115 B.R. 34, 36, 38 n.4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1990) (noting that "[tihe need for cash is usually immediate" and that the need for "[tirade
credit is crucial" to an ongoing business).
104. See Cole, supra note 101, at 1910 app. 1 (reprinting Open Letter from Judge
Peter J. Walsh to the Delaware Bankruptcy Bar; noting, inter alia, that proposed orders
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their attendant authorizing orders and supporting findings of
fact and conclusions of law, not to mention supporting motions,
affidavits and declarations, run in the hundreds, often thousands
of pages. Given current case loads for judges and lawyers, it is
simply not reasonable to expect meaningful review and critical
analysis of those documents in anything less than thirty days." 5
This is achieved through the proposed amendments.
Indeed, substantial potential for abuse exists in any system
of fast-track approval."' Here, the debtor, proposed purchasers,
proposed lenders, and insiders can create an emergency giving
them access to the "immediate and irreparable harm" interim
approval procedure of Rule 4001(c)(2). Express collusion is not
needed; the emergency may arise from an "invisible hand"
guiding the different parties and their professional actors as they
engage in brinkmanship and delay in reaching a final agreement
or bringing the motion for approval. ' Given this avenue for
speedy relief, the fifteen-day period of Rule 4001(c)(2) should be
lengthened to thirty days to allow better opportunity for affected
parties to review and respond to the motion for final approval of
the sale.
The balance of the amendments needed to carry out this
proposal is straightforward and requires little explanation. They
all position a nonplan sale parallel to a plan in terms of
procedure, substance, and effect. As with a confirmed plan, there
is a need for finality in a nonplan sale; thus, it is appropriate to
amend the definition of "substantial consummation" to apply to
for obtaining credit under Rule 4001(c)(2) "should not state that the parties in interest
have been given 'sufficient and adequate notice' of the motion").
Nine times out of ten this is simply not true. Rule 4001(c)(2) contemplates an
expedited hearing with little or no notice (at least not the type of notice that
would be sufficient to prepare for an effective participation by third parties).
Consequently, the order should simply recite that the hearing is being held
pursuant to the authorization of Rule 4001(c)(2).
Id. at 1912.
105. See id.; see also In re Ames Dep't Stores, 115 B.R. at 38 n.4 (noting "[tihere are
few reported decisions" regarding motions to obtain credit because of the workload of the
bench, the volume of such motions, and the time that would be necessary to write such
opinions).
106. See, e.g., In re Indus. Valley Refrigeration and Air Conditioning Suppliers, Inc.,
77 B.R. 15, 21 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
The strength of the showing necessary to satisfy each of these elements is
heightened by the fact that the protections of Subchapter II of Chapter 11 are
absent, and such agreements are typically considered on an expedited basis,
thus impeding interested parties from making the complete investigation and
amassing of contrary evidence which otherwise would be possible.
Id.
107. This invisible hand, among other things, is the subject of another article. See
Kuney, Hijacking of Chapter11, supra note 67.
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those sales as well as to plans to provide finality and protection
for the purchaser. This is in addition to the protections afforded
the purchaser by § 363(m) and the doctrine of equitable
mootness.10 '
§ 1101. Definitions for this chapter
(2) "substantial consummation" means(A) transfer of all or substantially all of the
property proposed by the plan or the nonplan sale
to be transferred;
(B) assumption by the debtor or by the successor to
the debtor under the plan or the nonplan sale of
the business or of the management of all or
substantially all of the property dealt with by the
plan; and
(C) commencement of distribution under the plan.

§ 1103. Powers and duties of committees
(c) A committee appointed under section 1102 of this
title may(3) participate in the formulation of a plan or the
nonplan sale, advise those represented by such a
committee of such committee's determinations as
to any plan formulated, and collect and file with
the court acceptances or rejections of a plan;
§ 1106. Duties of trustee and examiner
(a) A trustee shall(5) as soon as practicable, file a plan under section
1121 of this title, file a report of why the trustee
will not file a plan or propose a nonplan sale, or
recommend conversion of the case to a case under
Chapter 7, 12, or 13 of this title or dismissal of the
case;
The inability to achieve either confirmations of a plan or
approval of a nonplan sale should be cause to force the debtor
108.
See Kuney, MisinterpretationsI, supra note 2, at 241 n.28 (discussing § 363(m)
and equitable mootness authorities). See generally John Collen, Bankruptcy Sales of Real
Estate: Section 363(m) Title Endorsements, 26 REAL EST. L.J. 126 (1997) (exploring the
meaning of § 363(m)).
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through the other two exits from Chapter 11-conversion to
Chapter 7 or dismissal.'0
§ 1112. Conversion or dismissal
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, on
request of a party in interest or the United States trustee
or bankruptcy administrator, and after notice and a
hearing, the court may convert a case under this chapter
to a case under chapter 7 of this title or may dismiss a
case under this chapter, whichever is in the best interest
of creditors and the estate, for cause, including(1) continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and
absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation;
(2) inability to effectuate a plan or a nonplan sale;
(3) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is
prejudicial to creditors;
(4) failure to propose a plan under section 1121 or a
nonplan sale under sections 363(b) and, as
appropriate, (f) of this title within any time fixed by
the court;
(5) denial of confirmation of every proposed plan or
failure to obtain approval of every proposed nonplan
sale and denial of a request made for additional time
for filing another plan or proposing another nonplan
sale or a modification of a plan or nonplan sale;
(6) revocation of an order of confirmation under
section 1144 of this title, and denial of confirmation
of another plan or a modified plan under section 1129
of this title;
(7) inability to effectuate substantial consummation
of a confirmed plan or an aproved nonplan sale;
(8) material default by the debtor with respect to a
confirmed plan;
(9) termination of a plan or a nonplan sale by reason
of the occurrence of a condition specified in the plan;
Retiree benefits are of increasing importance in public
policy." ° Recognizing this, amending § 1114 to extend the same
protections to retirees under a nonplan sale as they would enjoy

109. Refer to note 9 supra(discussing these two exit strategies).
110. See generally Colleen E. Medill, Challenging the Four "Truths" of Personal
Social Security Accounts: Evidence from the World of 401(K) Plans, 81 N.C. L. REV. 901
(2003) (evaluating critically the final recommendations of the President's Commission to
Strengthen Social Security).
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under plan confirmation only makes good sense."' It would also
close the loophole that the present nonplan sale procedure
allows."'
§ 1114. Payment of insurance benefits to retired employees
(e)(2) Any payment for retiree benefits required to be
made before a plan confirmed under section 1129 of
this title or a nonplan sale is approved under sections
363(b) and, as appropriate, (f) of this title is effective
has the status of an allowed administrative expense as
provided in section 503 of this title.
(i) No retiree benefits paid between the filing of the
petition and the time a plan confirmed under section
1129 of this title or a nonplan sale is approved under
sections 363(b) and, as appropriate, (f) of this title
becomes effective shall be deducted or offset from the
amounts allowed as claims for any benefits which
remain unpaid, or from the amounts to be paid under
the plan with respect to such claims for unpaid
benefits, whether such claims for unpaid benefits are
based upon or arise from a right to future unpaid
benefits or from any benefits not paid as a result of
modifications allowed pursuant to this section.
Again, in keeping with the goal of making the two
procedures as parallel as possible, those who are authorized to
file a plan should also be able to file a motion to approve a
proposal for a nonplan sale. Those that cannot, should not.
§ 1121. Who may file a plan
(a) The debtor may file a plan or a proposal for a
nonplan sale with a petition commencing a voluntary
case, or at any time in a voluntary case or an
involuntary case.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this section, only
the debtor may file a plan or a proposal for a nonplan
sale until after 120 days after the date of the order for
relief under this chapter.
(c) Any party in interest, including the debtor, the
trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity security
holders' committee, a creditor, an equity security
111.
See Kuney, Misinterpretations I, supra note 2, at 278-80 (discussing how
reorganization by sale rather than by plan of reorganization bypasses statutory
protections for retiree benefits that are part of the plan process).
112.
Id.
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holder, or any indenture trustee, may file plan or a
proposal for a nonplan sale if and only if(1) a trustee has been appointed under this
chapter;
(2) the debtor has not filed a plan or proposals for a
nonplan sale before 120 days after the date of the
order for relief under this chapter; [or]
(3) the debtor has not filed a plan that has been
accepted, before 180 days after the date of the
order for relief under this chapter, by each class of
claims or interests that is impaired under the
plan[.] or
(4) the court, for cause, so orders.
(e) In a case which the debtor is a small business and
elects to be considered a small business(1) only the debtor may file a plan or a proposal for
a nonplan sale until after 100 days after the date of
the order for relief under this chapter;
(2) all plans or a proposal for nonplan sales shall be
filed within 160 days after the date of the order for
relief; and
Improving and standardizing the method of evaluating
disclosure associated with a nonplan sale is at the heart of this
proposal for statutory reform. Drawing on twenty years of
precedent under § 1125 appears wise. The standards developed
in the caselaw may be susceptible to different interpretations,
but this flexibility allows those standards to work in a multitude
of factual settings and is a strength.' Despite the use of the
same disclosure standard for both a plan and a nonplan sale,
disclosure for the nonplan sale will be dramatically less
burdensome and complicated than that for a plan. Plan
disclosure statements typically cover the following: the history of
the debtor; the debtor's operation and finances; the debtor's
assets; the debtor's creditors, interest holders, and insiders; the
plan's system of classification of claims and interests; the plan's
proposed treatment of each class of claims and interests; the
113. Congress deliberately defined "adequate information" in an open-ended manner,
trusting the courts to make particular case-by-case decisions, without requiring
burdensome, unnecessary, and cumbersome detail. In re Dakota Rail, Inc., 104 B.R. 138,
143 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989). The current statute expressly provides that a disclosure
statement need not include a valuation or appraisal of the debtor or its assets. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1125(b) (2000). The same standards should apply to disclosure regarding a proposed
nonplan sale.
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plan's means of implementation; an analysis of plan alternatives,
including liquidation; and other matters.114 Adequate information
regarding a proposed sale would not require this universal-inscope discussion of the debtor's past, present, and proposed
future. Rather, it would be a sale-specific disclosure that would
encompass the assets being sold, prior marketing efforts, the
terms of the proposed sale, and a discussion of the consideration
to be received. This is only a fraction of plan disclosure to which
even the least complex debtor is subject. Thus, although
importing the adequate information standard into nonplan sale
practice should ensure proper notice and an opportunity for
parties in interest to be heard on the subject, the nonplan sale
process should remain relatively streamlined when compared
with the plan disclosure process, which has many opportunities
for parties in interest to raise objections over matters that they
are not really or terribly concerned with in order to wrest some
advantage from the debtor and the terms of the plan.1 5 Thus,
§ 1125(a) should be amended to include the proper nonplan sale.
§ 1125. Postpetition disclosure and solicitation
(a) In this section and insection 363(b)(1)(1) "adequate information" means information of
a kind, and in sufficient detail, as far as is
reasonably practicable in light of the nature and
history of the debtor and the condition of the
debtor's books and records, that would enable a
hypothetical reasonable investor typical of
holders of claims or interests of the relevant
class to make an informed judgment about the
plan or proposed nonplan sale but adequate
information need not include such information

114. In re Metrocraft Publ'g Servs., Inc., 39 B.R. 567, 568 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984)
(reviewing disclosure statement approval standards and setting out a nineteen factor list
of items of information, including some of those listed in the text of this Article).
115. This is not to say that objecting to a disclosure statement on factually or legally
valid grounds which a party does not really care about in order to gain an unrelated or
distantly related concession from the debtor is inappropriate or should be prohibited. That
is a hallmark of Chapter 11 practice. Cf, e.g., Official Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v.
Mabey, 832 F.2d 299, 302 (4th Cir. 1987) (rejecting the establishment of an emergency
treatment fund for tubal reconstructive surgery or in vitro fertilization to eligible Dalkon
Shield claimants on the ground that Chapter 11 disbursements-other than under a
confirmed plan of reorganization-violated the Bankruptcy Code, even though the cost to
the estate of delaying payment to the claimants would dramatically increase their claims
to the detriment of equity holders and other creditors). However, by limiting the scope of
disclosure regarding a nonplan sale to issues relating to the sale itself, as opposed to an
entire reorganization, the scope of these objections can be narrowed, resulting in a process
that is more streamlined than the plan confirmation process, which is exactly the result
that the insolvency community seeks to obtain through nonplan sales.
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about any other possible or proposed plan or
nonplan sale ....
Further, extending the same protections to those that
appropriately solicit support or opposition to a plan to those
doing so for a nonplan sale makes good sense. The carrot,
insulation from liability, is an incentive for solicitation of
support or objections in good faith and in compliance with the
Code.
§ 1125. Postpetition disclosure and solicitation
(e) A person that solicits acceptance or rejection of a
plan or that seeks or supports or objects to approval
of a nonplan sale, in good faith and in compliance
with the applicable provisions of this title, or that
participates, in good faith and in compliance with
applicable provisions of this title, in the offer,
issuance, sale, or purchase of a security, offered or
sold under the plan, of the debtor, of an affiliate
participating in a joint plan with the debtor, or of a
newly organized successor to the debtor under the
plan, is not liable, on account of such solicitation or
participation, for violation of any applicable law,
rule, or regulation governing solicitation of
acceptance or rejection of a plan or the offer,
issuance, sale, or purchase of securities.
Section 1126 should be amended to make it clear that it is the
court that approves or disapproves a nonplan sale and that the
substance and procedure of the process is that of § 363(b) and, if
applicable, (f)." 6 Continuing with the goal of paralleling the plan
process, the postconfirmation vesting powers and the plan
implementation statutes should be amended to include nonplan
sales. This, combined with the modification of § 363(f) to expressly
allow nonplan sales free and clear of claims as well as interests, will
bring nonplan sale practice into line with plan sale practice.

Thus, consistent with existing law, under nonplan sales and plan sales alike, a
116.
secured creditor's § 363(k) credit bid rights will be preserved. Section 363(k) provides: "At
a sale under subsection (b) of this section of property that is subject to a lien that secures
an allowed claim, unless the court for cause orders otherwise the holder of such claim may
offset such claim against the purchase price of such property." Thus, by its own terms,
363(k) applies to 363(b) sales. Under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), covering cram down upon a
secured creditor whose collateral is to be sold, the sale is also subject to the 363(k) credit
bid right.
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§ 1126. Acceptance of plan & approval of nonplan sales
(h) A nonplan sale shall be approved or disapproved by
the court pursuant to sections 363(b) and, as
appropriate, (f) of this title.
§ 1141. Effect of plan confirmation or approval of nonplan
sale
(a) Except as provided in subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) of
this section, the provisions of a confirmed plan or an
approved nonplan sale bind the debtor, any entity
issuing securities under the plan, any entity acquiring
property under the plan or the nonplan sale, and any
creditor, equity security holder, or general partner in
the debtor, whether or not the claim or interest of such
creditor, equity security holder, or general partner is
impaired under the plan or the nonplan sale and
whether or not such creditor, equity security holder, or
general partner has accepted the plan or supported the
nonplan sale.
(c) Except as provided in subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) of
this section and except as otherwise provided in the plan,
the nonplan sale, or in the order confirming the plan or
the order approving the preplan, after confirmation of a
plan or approval of a nonplan sale, the property dealt
with by the plan or nonplan sale is free and clear of all
claims and interests of creditors, equity security holders,
and of general partners in the debtor.
§ 1142. Implementation of plan or nonplan sale
applicable
otherwise
any
(a)
Notwithstanding
nonbankruptcy law, rule, or regulation relating to
financial condition, the debtor and any entity organized or
to be organized for the purpose of carrying out the plan or
nonplan sale shall carry out the plan or nonplan sale and
shall comply with any orders of the court.
(b) The court may direct the debtor and any other
necessary party to execute or deliver or to join in the
execution or delivery of any instrument required to effect
a transfer of property dealt with by a confirmed plan or
approved nonplan sale, and to perform any other act,
including the satisfaction of any lien, that is necessary for
the consummation of the plan or nonplan sale.
Finally, § 1146 should be amended in two places to ensure
that the nonplan sale process offers the same substantive and
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procedural benefits as the plan process. The amendment to
§ 1146(c) conforms the statute to the increasingly employed-but
statutorily unauthorized-practice of exempting nonplan sales
from stamp or similar taxes."'
§ 1146. Special tax provisions
(c) The issuance, transfer, or exchange of a security, or
the making or delivery of an instrument of transfer
under a plan confirmed under section 1129 or a
nonplan sale approved under section 363(b) and, if
appropriate, section 363(f) of this title, may not be
taxed under any law imposing a stamp tax or similar
tax.
(d) The court may authorize the proponent of a plan or
a nonplan sale to request a determination, limited to
questions of law, by a State or local governmental unit
charged with responsibility for collection or
determination of a tax on or measured by income, of the
tax effects, under section 346 of this title and under the
law imposing such tax, of the plan or the nonplan sale.
In the event of an actual controversy, the court may
declare such effects after [timing provisions
omitted] ....

This concludes the amendments necessary to achieve the goal
of establishing a comprehensive statutory basis for nonplan sales as
an alternative exit strategy from Chapter 11. The amendments are
modest in form, but their effect can be huge. The existing national
patchwork of nonplan sale procedures and the failure of Congress
and the Rules Committee to address the practice is an invitation for
abuse and confusion."' Adopting these or similar statutory and
rules amendments can establish an efficient, uniform process to
establish the nonplan sale as an explicit exit strategy for businesses
reorganizing under Chapter 11.
IV. CONCLUSION
Currently, nonplan sale practice occurs nationwide under a
variety of locally developed procedure and without clear statutory
117. See In re Automationsolutions Int'l, LLC, 274 B.R. 527 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002)
(reviewing proposed order approving sale of substantially all the assets for a business and
rejecting as unsupportable a § 1146(c) tax exemption provision). But see In re Hechinger
Inv. Co., 276 B.R. 43 (D. Del. 2002) (upholding the § 1146(c) exemption provision in a sale
order because the sale was substantially similar in effect to a plan and limiting § 1146(c)
to postconfirmation transactions would undermine the purpose of facilitating chapter 11
plans), rev'd, 335 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2003).
118. Refer to Appendix infra.
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or national rule-based authorization and guidance. This Article
proposes institution of a uniform national procedure for nonplan
sales that would authorize sales of substantially all of a
business's assets free and clear of claims and interests and
addresses the need for certainty, predictability, and due process
for those affected by these sales. It is time to recognize that the
reorganization market has demanded this process, and it is time
for Congress to provide for a uniform, national procedure that
suitably accommodates the competing interests involved.
V.

APPENDIX

The following sections detail the myriad approaches taken
across the country in local rules addressing § 363(b) and § 363(f)
sales and then summarizes this information in chart form. This
listing may not be all-inclusive; it demonstrates the variety of
local practice and procedures nationwide.
A. Local Rules Applicable to § 363(b) Sales
1. Notice Provisions.
a. No Court Order Required if No Objection. Some courts
allow sales outside the ordinary course of business without a
court order if there is no objection to a notice of intent to sell or
similar document served on interested parties. The time of the
notice ranges from fifteen to thirty days depending on the
jurisdiction.' 9
b. Negative Notice: Court Order Required. Some local
courts allow sales outside the ordinary course of business by
filing an ex parte order for the sale followed by an opportunity for
119. See C.D. CAL. BANKR. R. 6004-1(b) (fifteen days); D. COLO. BANKR. R. 604
(fifteen days); D.D.C. BANKR. R. 2002-1(b) (twenty days); M.D. FLA. BANKR. R. 6004-1(a)
(twenty days); S.D. ILL. BANKR. R. 2002-1(A) (not specifying the number of days, but
allowing for sale without involvement of the court); N.D. IOWA BANKR. R. 6004-1(a)
(twenty days); E.D. LA. BANKR. R. 9013-1(B)(b) (twenty to thirty days); D. MD. BANKR. R.
2002-1(a) (twenty days); E.D. MICH. BANKR. R. 6004-1(a) (fifteen days); D.N.H. BANKR. R.
6004-1(a)(3) (twenty days negative notice when the sale is not of all or substantially all of
the assets); S.D.N.Y. BANKR. R. 2002-2(b) (twenty days); E.D.N.C. BANKR. R. 6004-1
(fifteen days); D.N.D. BANK. R. 2002-1 (fifteen days if notice of sale filed by trustee; court
order required if notice of sale filed by the debtor); S.D. OHIO BANKR. R. 6004-1(b)(1)(F)
(twenty days); N.D. OKLA. BANKR. R. 2002(a), 6004 (twenty days and objections must be
served and filed not less than five days before the proposed sale); D.S.C. BANKR. R. 60041, 9014-2 (referring to Clerk's Instruction 9014-2(d), which stipulates that the time period
is fifteen days); N.D. TEX. BANKR. R. 2002.1(a)(2), 6004.1(a) (twenty days); D. VT. BANKR.
R. 6004-1(b)-(c) (follows the minimum notice period in the Federal Bankruptcy Rules of
Procedure); E.D. WASH. BANKR. R. 2002-1(c)(1) (twenty-three days).
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interested parties to object to the sale and obtain a hearing;
others require any objectors to file a response within a certain
number of days."'
c. Specific Notice Text: Terms of Sale. For sales outside the
ordinary course of business, many local rules require a
declaration in the notice of the proposed terms of the sale
including what fees will be paid in connection with the sale, what
effect the sale will have on the debtor's operations, the identity of

120. See S.D. ALA. BANKR. R. 9007-1(a)(3), (b)(4) (requiring twenty days negative
notice for objections to motions to use, sell, or lease property not in the ordinary course of
business); S.D. CAL. BANKR. R. 2002-2(d) (after debtor in possession files a notice of
intended action, persons opposing have twenty-eight days (if personal service) or thirtyone days (if service by mail) to file a request and notice for hearing); M.D. FLA. BANKR. R.
2002-4(a)(3), (b)(3) (allowing a trustee to file a notice of hearing on proposed sale with an
opportunity to object twenty days prior to the hearing date); S.D. FLA. BANKR. R. 9013l(D)(2) (twenty days negative notice, and stating that failure to respond will be deemed
consent to the entry of the order in the form attached to the motion); D. HAW. BANKR. R.
9013-1(c) (requiring movant to serve notice and opportunity to be heard stating that if
there is no response within fifteen days of service the court may grant relief by default);
D. ME. BANKR. R. 6004-1 (requiring a minimum twenty day period for filing objections,
which may be shortened by a court order, and allowing the court to issue an order
following the minimum notice period for sales of the debtor's estate); D. MASS. BANKR. R.
6004-1(a)(3) (allowing the court to approve a private sale when no objections have been
filed); E.D. Mo. BANKR. R. 9061-1(A)-(B) (a response and request for hearing must be
filed within twenty days of service of motion to sell estate property); D. MONT. BANKR. R.
9013-1(d) (general motion practice provides for ten day negative notice from date of
service of motion for sale); D.N.M. BANKR. R. 9013-1(c)(1) (general motion practice
provides for twenty day negative notice from date of service of motion); E.D.N.Y. BANKR.
R. 2002-1(b) (requiring twenty day notice after filing a notice of sale); W.D.N.C. BANKR. R.
9013-1(e) (objectors have fifteen days to respond after service of the motion); D.N.D.
BANKR. R. 2002-1 to 2002-2 (fifteen day negative notice and court order required if notice
and motion for sale filed by the debtor; no order required if filed by trustee); M.D. PA.
BANKR. R. 6004(a)-l(b)(1)(L) (requiring notice of twenty days for objection); D.R.I. BANKR.
R. 6004-1(b) (although not officially termed a negative notice procedure, motion for a sale
outside the ordinary course of business can be ordered and made without a formal hearing
if there are no objections to the notice of the sale); D.S.C. BANKR. R. 6004-1(b), 9014-2, CI9014-2(c) (providing for twenty day "passive" (negative) notice); M.D. TENN. BANKR. R.
9013-1(a) (general motion procedure provides for twenty day negative notice from date of
service of the motion); W.D. TENN. BANKR. R. 9013-1(b) (same); E.D. TEX. BANKR. R.
9007(a) (twenty day negative notice procedure from date of service of the motion and
notice of sale); S.D. W. VA. BANKR. R. 8.01(d)(2) (twenty day negative notice required).
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paid, and the amount of any
the purchaser, the consideration
12 1
claims against the property.
d. Specific Notice Text: Procedure. Some local rules require
the notice of a sale of the debtor's property to contain specific
notice provisions that explain the procedure for the sale. 2
121.
D. ALASKA BANKR. R. 6004-1(a)(2) (requiring the notice to contain the terms of
sale including the name of the purchaser); D. ARIZ. BANKR. R. 6004(a) (requiring the
notice of sale to set forth the terms and conditions of the offer, whether higher or better
bids can be entertained, a description of the property, the date by which objections must
be filed, whether there is an appraisal and, if so, the value stated therein, all entities
known to have an interest in the property, and whether the sale is free and clear of liens
and interests or subject to them and a description of any such interests); D.D.C. BANKR.
R. 6004-1(a)(3), (5) (requiring notices to identify the purchaser, state all consideration
paid and to be paid by the purchaser, and the terms of payment); M.D. GA. BANKR. R.
6004-1(b), (d) (requiring the name and address of the proposed buyer to be in the notice,
as well as a description of the property); D. IDAHO BANKR. R. 2002.1(b)(1)(A)-(D)
(requiring a description of the property, time and place of sale, terms of sale, and whether
the sale is free and clear of liens to be included in the notice); N.D. IOWA BANKR. R. 60041(e) (requiring a reasonable description of the property); E.D. KY. BANKR. R. 6004-1
(requiring notice to state whether the sale is subject to liens and interests); D. ME.
BANKR. R. 6004-1 (requiring the notice to disclose the terms and conditions of the sale); D.
MD. BANKR. R. 6004-1(a)(3), (a)(5), (b) (requiring the name of purchaser and payment
terms of the sale and limiting certain types of charges paid in connection with the sale
unless included in the notice); W.D. MICH. BANER. R. 6004(a) (requiring a description of
the property to be sold); E.D.N.Y. BANKR. R. 6004-1(b)(i)-(v) (requiring a general
description of the property and the terms of sale); S.D.N.Y. BANKR. R. 6004-1(a) (requiring
notice of the terms and conditions of the sale); W.D.N.Y. BANKR. R. 6004-1(A) (requiring
the notice to contain terms of sale sufficient to inform creditors as to the wisdom of the
proposed sale); S.D. OHIO BANKR. R. 6004-1(b)(1)(A)-(C) (requiring a description of the
property and the terms of the sale); D. OR. BANKR. R. 2002-1(B)(2) (requiring the notice to
contain a description of the property and the terms and conditions of the sale); M.D. PA.
BANKR. R. 6004(a)-l(b)(1) (requiring the terms and conditions of the sale to be included in
the notice); D.R.I. BANKR. R. 6004-1(b) (requiring the notice to give a summary of the
terms and conditions of the proposed sale); D.S.D. BANKR. R. 6004-1 (requiring a
description of the property and the terms and conditions of the proposed sale); E.D. TEX.
BANKR. R. 6004(b) (requiring notice of sale to state the name and address of the proposed
buyer, the proposed sale price, the estimated cost of the sale, including commissions and
fees, the names and addresses of all those claiming an interest in the property, and 20 day
negative notice language); W.D. TEx. BANKR. R. 6004(b)(1) (requiring the name of the
buyer on the notice); D. VT. BANKR. R. 6004-1(e)(2) (requiring terms of sale regarding
bidding, form of funds, and other sale particulars); E.D. WIS. BANKR. R. 6004 (sales of
substantially all of the assets require myriad disclosures in the notice of sale including
term of the sale, valuation methods, identity of creditors and interest holders, and
disclosure of relationships).
122. See D. ARiz. BANxR. R. 6004-1 (listing provisions including the time and place of
sale, filing date for objections, and offer terms and conditions); C.D. CAL. BANKR. R. 60041(b) (requiring the notice to state the time for objections and stating that if there is no
timely objection, the trustee may take the action described in the notice of intent); N.D.
IOWA BANKR. R. 6004-1(c) (requiring the notice to state that objections to the proposed
sale must be filed and served within twenty days of the notice, that objections to the sale
will be served with separate notice, and that if there are no timely objections the sale will
proceed); E.D. LA. BANKR. R. 9013-1(B)(d) (requiring the notice to contain contact
information of the movant and information on how to object); D. ME. BANKR. R. 6004-1(c)(d) (requiring the date and time of the hearing and the method for objection to be
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Specific Notice Text: Valuation Method. Some local rules

require that the notice contain valuation information such as
estimated fair market value, appraised value, or scheduled value
of the property to be sold and the basis for the valuation."'
f. Disclosure
of Connections,
Relationships,
and
Compensation. Information regarding relationships among buyer
and debtor, trustee, or other interested parties (usually in the
case of a private sale) as well as compensation derived from the
sale must be disclosed under some courts' local rules. Generally,
the disclosure must be in the notice of intent to sell .
contained in the notice of a proposed sale); D. MASS. BANKR. R. 6004-1(a) (requiring notice
of a private sale to outline the procedures for bidding and objecting to the sale); E.D.N.Y.
BANKR. R. 6004-1(b) (requiring notice of the time to examine the property and the date by
which objections must be filed); N.D.N.Y. BANKR. R. 6004-1(c) (requiring a conspicuous
statement that the sale is proposed under § 363(b)); D.N.D. BANKR. R. 2002-1 (requiring
instruction that any objection must be filed in fifteen days); S.D. OHIO BANKR. R. 60041(b)(1)(F) (requiring the notice to disclose the process for objections); D. OR. BANKR. R.
2002-1(B)(2)(c)-(d) (requiring the notice to provide where the property description can be
obtained, how it can be previewed, and the method for submitting competing bids); M.D.
PA. BANKR. R. 6004(a)-1(b)(1)(F)-(G), (M) (requiring the notice to state how to obtain a
description of the property, where it can be examined, to whom to direct inquiries, and
other procedural information); D.P.R. BANKR. R. 6004 (requiring the notice of sale to
contain a description of any chattels and to state as to sales of real property that
documents regarding sale procedure are available in the clerk's office); D.R.I. BANKR. R.
6004-1(b) (allowing the notice of intent to sell to state that "absent timely objection, the
proposed sale be considered without a formal hearing"); E.D. TEX. BANKR. R. 6004(b)
(stating that the notice must contain the names and addresses of proposed buyers and
judgment creditors and details regarding the sale); E.D. WASH. BANKR. R. 2002-1(a)
(requiring the notice to state what must be done to object to a proposed sale and the time
limit for making such an objection); S.D. W. VA. BANKR. R. 8.01(d)(2) (requiring notice to
state that any objections must be filed within twenty days of service); see also S.D. FLA.
BANKR. R. 9013-1(D)(2) (allowing but not requiring notice to state that any objections
must be filed within twenty days of service).
123. See D. ALASKA BANKR. R. 6004-1(A)(2)(D) (requiring the notice to list the fair
market value of the property); D. ARIZ. BANKR. R. 6004-1(a)(11) (requiring the appraisal
value, if available, to appear in the notice); D.D.C. BANKR. R. 6004-1(a)(1) (requiring
notice of private sales to include the appraised value of the asset being sold, the date of
appraisal, and the name of the appraiser); D. IDAHO BANKR. R. 2002.1(b)(1)(E) (requiring

the notice of sale to include the estimated fair market value and a brief statement of the
basis for the estimate); D. MD. BANKR. R. 6004-1(a)(1), (2) (requiring the notice to contain
the appraised value or scheduled value of an asset being sold); D. NEB. BANKR. R. 60041(a) (notices of private sales must list the tax basis of the property, the tax consequences
of the sale, and the anticipated taxable income or loss from the sale); S.D. OHIO BANKR. R.
6004-1(bX1)(E) (requiring disclosure of the basis for the suggested sale price); D. OR.
BANKR. R. 2002-1(B)(2)(e) (requiring a statement concerning what independent appraisals
have been made); D.R.I. BANKR. R. 6004-1(b) (requiring a statement that the proposed
sale price is at least equal to or more than the value of the property); D.S.D. BANKR. R.
6004-1 (requiring the notice to contain the value of the property and how that value was
determined).
124.

See D. ALASKA BANKR. R. 6004-1(a)(2)(C), (E)-(F) (requiring disclosure of the

relationship of the purchaser to the debtor, the anticipated fees related to the sale, and
whether the sale will affect the debtor's ability to continue operating as a going concern);
D.D.C. BANKR. R. 6004-1(a)(4) (requiring disclosure of the relationship between the
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g. Notice to Specific Parties Beyond the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure. Some courts have specific notice
requirements that require notice to more parties than required
by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.12
h. Notice of Justification for the Sale. Some local rules
require the notice of a § 363(b) sale to make a statement
justifying the sale outside of any proposed plan of
reorganization." 6
i.

Identity of Creditors and Interests. Some courts require

purchaser and the debtor, the trustee, or any other party in interest); M.D. GA. BANKR. R.
6004-1(b) (requiring disclosure of the costs of sale, including commissions, auctioneer's
fees, cost of document preparation and recordation, and other expenses); D. IDAHO BANKR.
R. 2002.1(b)(1)(G) (requiring disclosure of the compensation to brokers, auctioneers, or
other professionals); D. MD. BANKR. R. 6004-1(a)(4), (b) (requiring a full statement of any
relationship between the purchaser and any party in interest and listing the types of
compensation that must be included in the notice); D. NEB. BANKR. R. 6004-1-A(1)
(notices of private sales must disclose name of purchaser and any direct or indirect
relationship the purchaser or its agents or employees have with the case); S.D. OHIO
BANKR. R. 6004-1(b)(1)(D) (requiring disclosure of the relationship of the buyer to the
debtor); D. OR. BANKR. R. 2002-1(B)(2)(b) (requiring disclosure of the relationship of
interested parties to the debtor); M.D. PA. BANKR. R. 6004(a)-l(b)(1)(J) (requiring the
notice of private sale to identify any affiliation with or relationship between the debtor,
any insiders, and the purchaser); W.D. TEX. BANKR. R. 6004(b)(2)-(3) (requiring
disclosure of the consideration received by the estate, including the costs of the
auctioneer's fees, document preparation, tax liabilities, and other customary closing
costs); D. VT. BANKR. R. 6004-1(e)(4) (requiring the notice to state the extent to which the
proceeds shall be used to benefit each class of creditors).
125.
See D. IDAHO BANKR. R. 2002.2(b)(2)(A) (requiring notice to all "creditors, equity
security holders, trustees and indenture trustees, the debtor, the chairman of any
committee appointed in the case, U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest"); N.D.
IND. BANKR. R. B-6004-1(a)-(b) (requiring notice to all parties found through reasonable
inquiry to hold liens or have interests in the property to be sold); D. MASS. BANKR. R.
6004-1(a)(1)(A) (requiring notice to potential purchasers in addition to the creditors,
parties in interest, and the U.S. trustee); D. MINN. BANKR. R. 2002-1(b)(3) (requiring
notice to all equity security holders); E.D.N.Y. BANKR. R. 2002-1(c) (requiring notice to
any party having or claiming an interest); E.D.N.C. BANKR. R. 6004-1 (requiring notice to
creditors and affected parties); M.D. PA. BANKR. R. 6004(a)-l(b)(2) (requiring notice to
indenture trustees, all creditors, and other parties not specifically mentioned in the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure); D.P.R. BANKR. R. 6004 (requiring the notice of
sale to be sent to all lien holders); D. VT. BANKR. R. 6004-1(b)(4) (requiring the names of
all parties in interest found by "reasonable investigation").
126. See D. IDAHO BANKR. R. 2002.1(c) (requiring a motion for an order to be
supported by an affidavit showing the necessity of the ordered sale); D. MASS. BANKR. R.
6004-1(a)(2)(A) (requiring notice of a private sale to include the reason why the sale must
be made outside of the Chapter 11 plan); D. NEB. BANKR. R. 6004-1-A(3) (notice of sales of
all or substantially all of the assets must state the business justification for disposing of
the estate assets before a disclosure statement has been approved or a plan confirmed);
E.D.N.Y. BANKR. R. 2002-1(a)(i) (requiring the reasons for the proposed action); N.D.N.Y.
BANKR. R. 6004-1(c) (requiring a business justification for disposing of the assets of the
estate); D. OR. BANKR. R. 2002-1(B)(2)(f)-(g) (requiring a statement concerning the equity
in the estate and why the sale is "proposed in advance of approval of a plan of
reorganization"); D. VT. BANKR. R. 6004-1(e)(7) (requiring a business justification for
disposal of the estate assets before the disclosure statement or plan confirmation).
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specific notice measures that identify creditors and the amount of
creditors' interests.'27
j. Advertisement of the Sale. The District of Rhode Island,
for example, requires an advertisement to be placed in a local
newspaper of general circulation. 2 '
2. ProceduralRequirements.
a. Specific Documents Required. Some courts require
production or filing of documents from auctions, a report of sale,
or other documents to complete a sale outside the ordinary course
of business.'

b. Use of General Motion Practice. Some courts have no
specific rules in place for motions for a sale outside the ordinary
course of business, but rather simply follow the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure and the requirements of general motion
practice in that court.30
127.
See D. ARIz. BANKR. R. 6004-1(a)(4) (requiring the notice of sale to, among other
things, list all entities known to have an interest in the property); M.D. GA. BANKR. R.
6004-1(d) (requiring the motion to sell to identify the creditors and the amounts of all
claims and interests attached to the property to be sold); D. IDAHO BANKR. R.
2002.1(b)(1)(F) (requiring the notice to include the amounts of each lien or encumbrance
and to identify each lienholder); D. MASS. BANKR. R. 6004-1(a)(2)(A) (requiring
identification of the holder of any lien or interest); N.D.N.Y. BANKR, R. 6004-1(c)
(requiring identification of the creditors and the extent to which their interests will be
satisfied by the proceeds of the sale); D.P.R. BANKR. R. 6004(A)(2), (4) (requiring notice to
list the amount of any liens or encumbrances and the holders of same).
128.
D.R.I. BANKR. R. 6004-1(c).
129.
See C.D. CAL. BANKR. R. 6004-2 (requiring an additional document to be filed
with the notice of intent to sell that is to be used for publication); S.D. CAL. BANKR. R.
6004-3 (requiring debtor-in-possession to file a report of sale and serve on the U.S.
Trustee and any official creditors' committee); D.D.C. BANKR. R. 6004-1(d) (requiring an
itemized statement of the property sold with specific statements to aid 'in the
identification of the property); N.D. IND. BANKR. R. B-6004-1(c) (requiring the debtor-inpossession to file a report of sale and serve it upon interested parties); M.D.N.C. BANKR.
R. 9013-1(b) (requiring documents to be attached "evidencing the related indebtedness
and perfected lien status" of the property); S.D. OHIO BANKR. R. 6004-1(b)(2)(A) (requiring
a report of sale to be filed); D. OR. BANKR. R. 6004-1(B) (requiring a report of sale to be
filed); E.D. PA. BANKR. R. 9014-3(f)(1) (requiring a proposed order to be attached to the
motion for sale); D.S.C. BANKR. R. 6004-1(d) (requiring the moving party to file a report of
sale within ten days of closing); M.D. TENN. BANKR. R. 6004-1(a) (requiring the trustee to
file and serve a copy of the report of sale on the debtor and U.S. Trustee); E.D. VA. BANKR.
R. 6004-2(D) (requiring the trustee or debtor to file a report of sale within thirty days
after the sale).
130,
See E.D. CAL. BANKR. R. 9014-1 (general motion practice for all bankruptcy
proceedings); D. COLO. BANKR. R. 913 (general motion practice for all bankruptcy
proceedings); D. DEL. BANKR. R. 5011-1 to 7001-1 (the table of contents in the local rules
shows specifically that there are no local rules pertaining to Part VI of the Federal Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure (Collection and Liquidation of Estate)); N.D. GA. BANKR. R.
9013-1 to 9013-3 (general motion practice; no rules specifically addressing sales); S.D. GA.
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c. Distinction Between Public and Private Sales. Some
courts have different rules for private sales versus public sales.'
d. De Minimis Sales. Some local rules set up different
BA NKR. R. 7.1-7.5 (general motion practice; no rules specifically addressing sales); N.D.
ILL. BANKR. R. 402 (general motion practice for sales outside the ordinary course of
business); S.D. IOWA BANKR. R. 5, 10, 11, 14 (general motion practice; no rules specifically
addressing sales); E.D. KY. BANKR. R. 6004-1 (using general motion practice with the
exception of requiring a statement in the notice of whether the sale is to be free and clear
or subject to interests); E.D. LA. BANKR. R. 9013-1(B) (no rules specifically addressing
sales, movant must provide at least twenty days notice of the hearing, and written
objections must be filed at least eight days prior to the date set for hearing); M.D. LA.
BANKR. R. 9013-1(a)(2), 9014-1(a) (general motion practice calls for notice to get tentative
hearing date or state that such hearing will be held only if an objection is timely filed and
served by noon on the Monday before the hearing (hearings are held on Friday of each
week)); W.D. LA. BANKR. R. 9013-1 to 9013-3 (general motion practice; no rules
specifically addressing sales); N.D. & S.D. Miss. BANKR. R. 13 (no rules addressing sales
specifically; general motion practice varies with particular judge); W,D. MO. BANKR. R.
6004-1, 9013-1 (general motion practice, excepting sales of assets worth less than $1000,
which do not require notice); D. MONT. BANKR. R. 9013-1(a)-(b), (d) (no rules specifically
addressing sales; general motion practice provides for negative notice); D. NEv. BANKR. R.
9014 (general motion practice; no rules specifically addressing sales); D.N.M. BANKR. R.
9013-1 (no rules specifically addressing sales; regular motion procedure provides for
twenty day negative notice); E.D. OKLA. BANKR. R. 9013-1 (no rules specifically apply to
sales, general motion practice provides for fifteen day negative notice); E.D. PA. BANKR. R.
9014-3(a) (distinguishing between motions determined with and without hearings); D.P.R.
BANKR. R. 9013 (no rules specifically addressing sales, general motion practice provides
for eleven day negative notice); E.D. TENN. BANKR. R. 7007-1 (general motion practice; no
rules specifically addressing sales); M.D. TENN. BANK. R. 6004-1(b) (stating that motions
to sell or lease property must comply with Rule 9013-1 which provides for twenty day
negative notice); W.D. TENN. BANKR. R. 9013-1(a)-(b) (general motion practice applies
and provides for twenty day negative notice); S.D. TEX. BANKR. R. 6004 (stating that
motions for sale of property must conform to the notice standards of general motion
practice); W.D. VA. BANKR. R. 9013-1 (general motion practice; no rules specifically
addressing sales); W.D. WASH. BANKR. R. 9013-1(a) (general motion practice; no rules
specifically addressing sales); N.D. W. VA. BANKR. R. 3.09 (general motion practice; no
rules specifically addressing sales); E.D. Wis. BANKR. R. 9014 (general motion practice
with fifteen day negative notice); D. WY. BANKR. R. 9013-1 (general motion practice; no
rules specifically addressing sales). Note that the Northern District of Alabama and the
Western District of Wisconsin have no local rules for general motion practice and no local
rules for sales outside of the ordinary course of business or sales free and clear. See N.D.
AiA. BANKR. R.; W.D. WIS. BANKRt. R. The Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas
have no local rules pertaining to sales, and their one local rule pertaining to motion
practice states only that attorneys submitting orders must list the complete name and
address of everyone who should receive a copy. E.D. & W.D. ARK. BANKR. R. 9013-1.
131.
See D.D.C. BANKR. R. 6004-1(a) (listing specific requirements for a private sale);
N.D. IOWA BANKR. R. 6004-1(d) (making a higher bid in a private sale the equivalent of an
objection); D. ME. BANKR. R. 6004-1(c) (requiring the terms of a private sale or the date
and time of a public sale to be included in the notice); D. MD. BANKR. R. 6004-1(a)
(requiring appraisal information or the scheduled value to be disclosed for a private sale);
D. MASS. BANKR. R. 6004-1 (distinguishing private sales from public auctions with
separate rules under subsections (a) and (b)); D. NEB. BANKR. R. 6004-1A(1) (requiring
additional information about the purchaser in the event of a private sale or lease);
E.D.N.Y. BANKR. R. 6004-1 (distinguishing private sales under subsection (b) of the rule);
D.S.D. BANKR. R. 6004-1 (requiring the notice to contain the names of the proposed
buyers for private sales).
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methods for selling property outside the ordinary course of
business when the value of the property is minimal. 32
e. Special Rules for Objection. Some local rules have
specific procedures that must be followed when an objection is
made, including who must file the notice of hearing and by what
date the objection, if any, must be filed.'
f. Special Rules for Orders Approving Sales Outside the
Ordinary Course of Business. The District Court for Vermont, for
example, has specific rules that govern orders granting a sale
outside the ordinary course of business."'
g. Formal Hearing Required for Sale of All or Substantially
All of the Debtor's Assets. Some local rules require a hearing for
a sale of all or substantially all of the debtor's assets.'
h. Prohibition of Certain Terms of Sale. Some courts
132. See D. COLO. BANKR. R. 604 (allowing the trustee to seek authority to sell all of
the nonexempt tangible property with an aggregate gross value of less than $2500 prior to
the meeting of creditors); W.D. Mo. BANKR. R. 6004-1 (allowing sales of items or groups of
items worth $1000 or less without the filing of a notice of intent to sell); S.D.N.Y. BANKR.
R. 6004-1(a) (requiring notice of a proposed sale having an aggregate gross value of at
least $2500 to include the time and place of the sale, whether it is public or private, and
the terms and conditions of the sale); D.N.D. BANKR. R. 2002-1 (allowing sale without
court approval absent objection when the value of the property is less than $5000); M.D.
PA. BANKR. R. 6004(d)-1 (allowing general notice for a sale where the aggregate gross
value of the property is less than $2500); D.S.C. BANKR. R. 6004-1(a) (allowing the trustee
to give general notice of a proposed sale when the aggregate gross value of the property is
less than $2500); E.D. VA. BANKR. R. 6004-2(C) (allowing the trustee to give general
notice of a proposed sale when the aggregate gross value of the property is less than
$2500).
133.
See C.D. CAL. BANKR. R. 6004-1(c) (requiring, after a timely objection, the
trustee to obtain a hearing date and give notice of the hearing date to the objecting
parties within twenty days of the date the objection is filed); E.D. LA. BANKR. R. 90131(B)(d)'(requiring objections to be filed eight days prior to a proposed hearing date); M.D.
LA. BANKR. R. 9014-1(d) (requiring the filing of a written objection on the Monday before
the scheduled hearing); E.D.N.Y. BANKR. R. 2002-1(d) (requiring objections to be in
writing and filed three days prior to proposed action or court order); E.D. VA. BANKR. R.
6004-2(B) (requiring objecting party to file the objection with the court five business days
prior to the proposed sale and to obtain a hearing date from the court); E.D. WASH.
BANKR. R. 2002-1(f)(l)-(2) (requiring the objecting party to state the grounds for the
objection in writing or have the objection stricken).
134.
See D. VT. BANKR. R. 6004-1(d) (requiring the order to identify the buyer, the
property sold, the amount of the sale, and any differences between the property actually
sold and listed on the notice of sale).
135.
See W.D.N.Y. BANKR. R. 6004-1(c) (requiring a hearing when a sale is of all or
substantially all of the debtor's assets); M.D. PA. BANKR. R. 6004(a)-l(b)(1)(D) (requiring
the notice to state the date of hearing once court approval has been attained); E.D. Wis.
BANKR. R. 6004 (requiring a hearing and myriad notice and disclosure requirements
before court approval of the sale of substantially all of the debtor's assets within sixty
days of the filing of the petition).
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prohibit the use of defensive measures such as break-up fees
when a sale of a debtor's property is being made without prior
court approval. '
i. Separate Order Required for Distribution of Proceeds.
The Northern District of Indiana requires that the distribution of
the proceeds of a sale outside the ordinary course of business be
made pursuant to a court order.'37
j. Special Rule for Complicated Sales. The Western
District of Pennsylvania requires the seller of property to notify
the court if the sale hearing will take more than the limited time
allow enough
for general motion hearings so that the court can
36
time to dispose of the motion to sell the property.
3. Other.
The Districts of Connecticut, New Jersey, and Utah set forth
numerous guidelines for conducting auction sales but are silent
regarding notice or motion procedures pertaining to sales. 39 The
District of Kansas prohibits certain persons-bankruptcy judges,
clerks, trustees and other officers in bankruptcy, and spouses
and employees of same-from purchasing property from the
estate, but otherwise does not address sales.'40 The Central
District of Illinois has no local bankruptcy rules."' The Middle
District of Alabama has proposed local rules drafted in May 2002,
but otherwise appears to operate via memoranda from the Chief
Bankruptcy Judge.'

136. See D.D.C. BANKR. R. 6004-1(c) (prohibiting a buyer's premium, break-up fee,
topping fee, or similar arrangement without court approval).
137.
N.D. IND. BANKR. R. B-6004-1(d).
138. See W.D. PA. BANKR. R. 6004-1 (referencing the Western District of
Pennsylvania's Court Procedures Manual).
139.
D. CONN. BANKR. R. 6004-1; D.N.J. BANKR. R. 6004-1; D. UTAH BANKR. R. 6005.
But see D. UTAH BANKR. R. 6005-1(i) (proposed) (provides that a hearing scheduled on a
sale to be conducted by a standing auctioneer may be stricken if no objections to the sale
are timely filed).
140. D. KAN. BANKR. R. 6004.1; see also N.D. OHIO BANKR. R. 6004-1(b) (prohibiting
sale to any person closely related to the professional appointed by the court in a sale).
141. Central District of Illinois Bankruptcy Court, General Information,
http://www.ilcb.uscourts.gov/manual/generalinformation.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
142. See William R. Sawyer, A Note on Motion Practice in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Alabama, http://www.almb.uscourts.gov/
Announcements/sawyer memoon_motion-practice.pdf (Aug. 28, 2002).
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B. Local Rules Applicable to § 363(f) Sales
Each provision listed under this section has been expressly
adopted for use in sales free and clear of all claims and interests.
The majority of the bankruptcy courts have no specific provisions
for sales free and clear as distinct from other sales. Where there
are rules, some are used in all sales outside of the ordinary
course of business (§ 363(b)), but all provisions contained in the
chart below and described in the following sections specifically
apply to sales free and clear. Probably the most comprehensive
example of the methods adopted by local courts for dealing with
sales free and clear can be found in the District of Oregon.'
1. Notice Provisions.
a. Specific § 363(f)(1)-(5) Grounds. To make a sale free and
clear of liens, some local rules require that the notice of a sale
free and clear contain a competent declaration of the specific
§ 363(f(1)-(5) provision that authorizes the sale and a factual
basis demonstrating that the moving party comes within that
code section."
143.

See D. OR. BANKR. FoRM 760.5.

144. See D. ALASKA BANKR. R. 6004-1(b)(3)(E) (requiring the disclosure of the
subparagraph of § 363(f) that authorizes the sale); N.D, CAL. BANKR. R. 6004-1(b)
(requiring a motion to sell free and clear to be supported by the declaration of an
individual competent to testify that sets forth the factual basis demonstrating that the
moving party comes within § 363(f) and which subsection of § 363(f) the party comes
within); D. HAW. BANKR. R. 6004-1(b) (requiring a motion to sell free and clear to be
supported by the declaration of an individual competent to testify that sets forth the
factual basis demonstrating that the moving party comes within § 363(f) and which
subsection of § 363(f) the party comes within); D. IDAHO BANKR. R. 2002.1(bX1XH)
(requiring the notice to list the subdivision of § 363(f) that authorizes the sale); D. MASS.
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b. Specific Notice Text: Terms of Sale. For a sale outside
the ordinary course of business that is free and clear of liens and
interests, many local rules require notice of the terms of the sale
including that it is a sale free and clear of liens or encumbrances,
the identity of affected creditors, any liens or encumbrances that
will not be paid from the proceeds, and other specific details.""
c. Specific Notice Text: Procedure. Some local courts
require the notice of a sale free and clear to contain specifics of
the sale procedure.146
BANKR. R. 6004-1(a)(2)(A) (requiring notice and accompanying motion for a private sale of
all of a debtor's assets to include the reason why the sale must be made outside of the
Chapter 11 plan); E.D.N.Y. BANKR. R. 2002-1(a) (requiring the reasons for the proposed
action); D. OR. BANKR. FORM 760.5 (requiring the "specific subsections of 11 U.S.C.
§ 363(f) on which the movant relies for authority to sell the property free and clear of
liens"); E.D. TEX. BANKR. R. 6004(b)(4) (requiring the notice to state the provision of§ 363
upon which the motion relies); E.D. WASH. BANKR. R. 6004-1(b)(1) (requiring the notice to
state the paragraph of 363(f) that authorizes the sale).
145. See D. ALASKA BANKR. R. 6004-1(b)(3)(C) (requiring notice to state that the
property is to be sold free and clear of liens and encumbrances); D. ARIZ. BANKR. R. 6004
(notice must state whether the sale is free and clear of liens and interests); D. IDAHO
BANKR. R. 2002.1(b)(1)(A)-(D) (requiring a description of the property, time and place of
sale, terms of sale, and whether the sale is free and clear of liens to be included in the
notice); E.D. KY. BANKR. R. 6004-1 (requiring notice to state whether property to be sold
is free and clear of liens and encumbrances); D. ME. BANKR. R. 6004-1(c) (requiring the
notice to disclose the terms and conditions of the sale); E.D. MICH. BANKR. R. 6004-1(b)(1)
(requiring a statement in the notice that the sale is to be free and clear); D.N.H. BANKR.
R. 6004-1(a)(1) (the notice must contain "the requisite information regarding the sale"); D.
OR. BANKR. FORM 760.5 (requiring that the notice contain a description of the property to
be sold, the terms and conditions of the sale, and the gross sales price); M.D. PA. BANKR.
R. 6004(a)-l(b)(1) (requiring the terms and conditions of the sale to be included in the
notice); D.S.C. BANKR. FORM 6004-1(a) (requiring the notice to list the type of sale, price,
buyer, and other terms of the sale); E.D. WASH. BANKR. R. 6004-1(b)(1) (requiring a
statement that the sale is free and clear of liens, the amount of those liens, and any liens
that will not be paid with the proceeds of the sale).
146. See D. ALASKA BANKR. R. 6004-1(b)(3)(A)-(B) (requiring the notice to state the
time within which objections may be filed and the date of the hearing on the motion); D.
ARIz. BANKR. R. 6004 (requiring the notice of sale to set forth a description of the
property, all entities known to have an interest in the property, whether the sale is free
and clear of or subject to interests and a description of such, the terms and conditions of
the offer, whether higher or better bids can be entertained, the date by which objections
must be filed, and whether there is an appraisal of the property, and if so, the value
stated therein); S.D. ILL. BANKR. R. 6004-1 (requiring the notice to contain the text "Any
higher bids must be stated in writing and received by (proponent of the motion) not later
than (The same date as the last date to object to the motion.)"); N.D. IOWA BANKR. R.
6004-1(c) (requiring the notice to state that objections to the proposed sale must be filed
and served within twenty days of the notice, that objections to the sale will be served with
separate notice, and that if there are no timely objections the sale will proceed); D. ME.
BANKR. R. 6004-1(c)-(d) (requiring the date and time of the hearing and the method for
objection to be contained in the notice of a proposed sale); E.D. MICH. BANKR. R. 60041(b)(1) (requiring the notice to state that absent objections, the authority to sell may be
granted without a hearing and that upon objection, a notice of the hearing will be sent to
the objecting party); D.N.H. BANKR. R. 6004-1(a)(4) (requiring the text "Hearing
Contingent Upon Objections Being Filed"); N.D. OKLA. BANKR. R. 6004(b) (movant must
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d. Specific Notice Text: Valuation Methods. Some local
rules require that the notice contain valuation information such
as estimated fair market value of the property to be sold and the
basis for the estimate.147
e. Disclosure
of Connections,
Relationships,
and
connections,
Compensation. Many courts require a statement of
14
relationships, and compensation related to the sale. 1
f. Identify Claims and Interests. Some local rules require
disclosure of the amount of each lien or encumbrance claimed
against the property and the identity of the lienholders.'49
first obtain a hearing date, and notice must state that if objections are not filed and
served at least five days prior to the scheduled hearing the court may strike the hearing
and grant the requested relief without further notice); D. OR. BANKR. FORM 760.5
(requiring the notice to state "IF YOU WISH TO OBJECT TO ANY ASPECT OF THE
SALE OR FEES DISCLOSED IN PTS. 12 OR 19 YOU SHALL BOTH: (1) ATTEND THE
HEARING NOTED IN PT. 20 BELOW AND, (2) WITHIN 20 DAYS OF THE MAILING
DATE BELOW, FILE WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT"); E.D. PA. BANKR. R. 6004-1
(requiring notice of sales free and clear to contain the date of the hearing and the
opportunities for objection); M.D. PA. BANKR. R. 6004(a)-1(b)(1)(F)-(G), (M) (requiring the
notice to state how to obtain a description of the property, where it can be examined, who
to direct inquiries to, and other procedural information); E.D. TEX. BANKR. R. 6004(b)
(requiring in the notice of sale specific negative notice language, the name and address of
the proposed buyer, the proposed sale price, the estimated cost of the sale including
commission and fees, and the names and addresses of all those claiming an interest in the
property); E.D. WASH. BANKR. R. 2002-1(a)(1)(B) (requiring the notice to state what must
be done to object to a proposed sale and the time limit for making such an objection); S.D.
W. VA. BANKR. R. 8.01(d)(3) (allowing movant to file either a motion with a request for
hearing or a negative twenty day notice that contains blanks for the hearing date and
time should an objection or request for hearing be filed).
147. See D. IDAHO BANKR. R. 2002.1(b)(1)(E) (requiring the notice of sale to include
the estimated fair market value and a brief statement of the basis for the estimate); D.
OR. BANKR. FORM 760.5 (requiring a "[slummary of all available information regarding
valuation, including any independent appraisals"); W.D. PA. BANKR. R. 9013.2B(1)(b)
(requiring the notice to state the market value of the property to be sold and the basis for
the valuation); D.R.I. BANKR. R. 6004-1(b) (requiring a statement that the proposed sale
price is at least equal to or more than the value of the property); D.S.C. BANKR. FORM
6004-1(a) (requiring the notice to contain the appraised value of the property); E.D.
WASH. BANKR. R. 6004-1(b)(1) (requiring the notice to state the estimated fair market
value of the property to be sold).
148.
See D. IDAHO BANKR. R. 2002.1(b)(1)(G) (requiring disclosure of the
compensation to brokers, auctioneers, or other professionals); D. OR. BANKR. FORM 760.5
(requiring disclosure of the relationship between the buyer and debtor as well as between
other parties to the transaction and the debtor); M.D. PA. BANKR. R. 6004(a)-1(b)(1)(J)
(requiring the notice of private sale to identify any affiliation with or relationship between
the debtor, any insiders, and the purchaser); D.S.C. BANKR. FORM 6004-1(a) (requiring,
under Local Rule 6004-1(b), the notice to disclose the relationship of debtor to buyer,
auctioneer's compensation, trustee's compensation, and the amount of proceeds that will
be paid to the estate).
149. See D. ALASKA BANKR. R. 6004-1(b)(3)(D) (requiring disclosure of the amount of
each lien or encumbrance claimed against the property); D. ARIZ. BANKR. R. 6004-1(a)(4)
(requiring the notice of sale to set forth all entities known to have interests in the
property); N.D. CAL. BANKR. R. 6004-1(a), (d) (requiring the motion to identify all parties
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g. Minimum Notice of Intention to Sell. The District of
South Carolina allows the trustee to give minimum notice of
intention to sell property free and clear without a hearing so long

as no party objects to the sale.5 °
2. ProceduralRequirements.
a. Specific Documents Required. Some district courts
require attachment of documents including a Uniform
Commercial Code financing statement report, a title report, and
other documents evincing the status of the title to the property
proposed to be sold free and clear.151
b. Formal Hearing Required. Some courts require a
hearing for a sale free and clear and provide that their rules for
sales without hearings do not apply.15
c.

Court Order with a Negative Notice Procedure. A court

affected by the order of sale); D. HAW. BANKR. R, 6004-1(a) (requiring the motion for
authority to sell free and clear of liens to identify by name the holders of a lien or other
interest whose property rights are or may be affected by the motion); D. IDAHO BANKR. R.
2002.1(b)(1)(F) (requiring the notice of sale to include the amounts of each lien or
encumbrance claimed against the property and the identity of each lienholder); D. MASS.
BANKR. R. 6004-1(a)(2)(A) (requiring identification of the holder of any lien or interest);
E.D. MICH. BANKR. R. 6004-1(b)(2)(B) (requiring the motion for sale to be served on, and
identify by name and address, all parties who have liens and interests); D. OR. BANKR.
FORM 760.5 (requiring the names and addresses of lienholders, the amounts of all liens on
the property to be sold, and the amount sought by secured creditors); M.D. PA. BANKR. R.
6004(c)-1(d) (requiring the movant to name as respondents all parties against whom relief
is sought); W.D. PA. BANKR. R. 9013.2(B)(1)(d)-(e) (requiring the "identity of each and
every lien" as well as the "type, priority, face amount and the best information of the
balance, and record location of each and every lien on the property subject to the [sale]");
E.D. TEX. BANKR. R. 6004(b)(3) (requiring notice of sale to state the names and addresses
of all those claiming an interest in the property, the nature of the claimed interest, and
the balance due).
150.
See D.S.C. BANKR. CLERK'S INSTRUCTION 9014-2 (allowing a minimum of fifteen
days to object to passive motions which include motions for a sale free and clear,
referenced by Local Rule 6004(1)(b)).
151.
See D. HAW. BANKR. R. 6004-1(b) (requiring that a Uniform Commercial Code
financing statement report, a current title report, or other satisfactory evidence of the
status of the title to real or personal property, be attached to the motion); E.D. PA. BANKR.
R. 9014-3(f) (requiring a proposed order to be attached to the motion for sale); D.S.C.
BANKR. R. 6004-1(d) (requiring the moving party to file a report of sale within ten days of
closing).
152. See S.D. ALA. BANKR. R. 9007-1(a)(3) (excluding sales free and clear from the
process for sales without a hearing); D. ALASKA BANKR, R. 6004-1(b)(2) (requiring a
hearing before a sale free and clear); M.D. FLA. BANKER. R. 2002-4(a)(3) (excluding sales
free and clear from types of motions that can be made without an actual hearing); D. OR.
BANKR. FORM 760.5 (requiring the notice to state the date of the hearing for the proposed
sale free and clear); M.D. TENN. BANKR. R. 9013-1(b)(7) (excluding sales free and clear
from types of motions that can be made without a hearing); N.D. TEX. BANKER. R.
9007.1(b) (excluding sales free and clear from negative notice procedure).
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may grant an order approving the sale free and clear upon failure

of interested parties to object within a minimum notice period.'
d. Necessity of a Sale. Because a sale free and clear of liens
and other interests does not always result in complete repayment
of creditors from the sale proceeds, some courts require notice of
the debts that will not be paid as well as why such a sale is
necessary under the circumstances."
e. Special Rules for Orders Approving a Sale. Some courts'
local rules create special rules governing an order to approve the
sale of the debtor's property. Generally, the courts apply these
rules for sales both outside the ordinary course of business and
free and clear of liens and interests.1 55
f. Special Form. To have a sale free and clear, the District
of Oregon requires a person to use a form prescribed by that
court to file a motion for a sale free and clear.156
g. Distinction Between Public and Private Sales. Some
courts' local rules require the notice of the proposed sale to state
5
whether the sale is to be private or public."

153. See D. ME. BANKR. R. 6004-1 (allowing the court to issue an order following the
minimum notice period for sales of the debtor's estate); D. MASS. BANKR. R. 6004-1(a)(3)
(allowing the court to approve a private sale when no objections have been filed); E.D.
MIcH. BANKR. R. 6004-1(b)(1) (allowing the court to grant a motion to sell free and clear
when no objections have been filed); D.N.H. BANKR. R. 6004-1(a)(3) (requiring twenty
days notice of the contingent hearing to creditors and interested parties); E.D. PA. BANKR.
R. 6004-1 (requiring a fifteen day negative notice procedure); M.D. PA. BANKR. R. 6004(c)1(c) (providing that after the clerk issues an order fixing an answer date, a hearing will be
held only if objections are brought); D.R.I. BANKR. R. 6004-1(b) (allowing a motion for sale
free and clear, although not officially termed a negative notice procedure, presumably to
be ordered and made without a formal hearing if there are no objections to the notice of
the sale).
154.
See D. ALASKA BANKR. R. 6004-1(b)(3)(F) (requiring disclosure of the necessity
of the sale and the liens and encumbrances that may be unpaid when the proceeds of the
sale appear to be insufficient to pay all the liens and encumbrances claimed against the
property); D. IDAHO BANKR. R. 2002.1(c) (requiring a motion for an order to be supported
by an affidavit showing the necessity of the ordered sale); D. OR. BANKR. FORM 760.5
(requiring a reason for the sale if the proceeds will not satisfy all claims and the reason
for proposing the sale prior to the plan of reorganization); W.D. PA. BANKR. R.
9013.2(B)(2) (requiring an allegation of the necessity of the sale or consent of the
lienholders if there is or may be no equity in the property for the creditors); E.D. WASH.
BANKR. R. 6004-1(b)(1) (requiring a brief statement of the necessity for the sale).
155.
See D.S.C. BANKR. R. 6004-1 (requiring terms of the sale and a process that can
override the automatic stay pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 6004(g));
E.D. WASH. BANKR. R. 6004-1(c) (requiring an order approving an unopposed sale of
estate property to be supported with an affidavit showing the necessity of the order).
156.
See D. OR. BANKR. R. 2002-1(BX3).
157.
See D.S.C. BANKR. FORM 6004-1(a) (containing on the notice for sale free and
clear two blanks, which must state whether the sale is to be public or private).
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h. Advertisement of the Sale. The District of Rhode Island
requires an advertisement to be placed in a local newspaper of
general circulation.'
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